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RACE-BASED REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL LAW
ION MEYN*
ABSTRACT
This Article evaluates the constitutional feasibility of using race-
based remedies to address racial disparities in the criminal system.
Compared to white communities, communities of color are over-
policed and over-incarcerated. Criminal system stakeholders recog-
nize that these conditions undermine perceptions of legitimacy
critical to ensuring public safety. As jurisdictions assiduously
attempt race-neutral fixes, they also acknowledge the shortcomings
of such interventions. Nevertheless, jurisdictions dismiss the feasi-
bility of deploying more effective race-conscious strategies due to the
shadow of a constitutional challenge. The apprehension is under-
standable. Debates around affirmative action in higher education
and government contracting reveal fierce hostility toward race-based
remedies.
This Article, however, contends that within the criminal system,
strict scrutiny requirements do not pose an insurmountable obstacle
to race-based policies. There is promising decisional law surround-
ing the use of race-conscious efforts to address criminal system
challenges. Drawing on this favorable doctrine, this Article tests the
constitutionality of race-based remedies in one of the most dynamic
areas in the criminal system: the use of risk assessment tools, which
jurisdictions are increasingly relying upon to make decisions, even
as these tools reproduce racial harms. To enrich the analysis, this
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tributions of Anya Gersoff, as well as Michael Longley, Melissa Rubio, and Manuel Sanchez
Moyano.
219
220 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:219
Article presents a case study of a jurisdiction struggling to mitigate
racial harms perpetuated by its pretrial risk assessment tool.
This Article finds reasons to be optimistic about how race-based
remedies might fare within the criminal system context, where courts
are predisposed to granting broad discretion to the stated needs of
criminal law stakeholders. Within this unique context, this Article
provides a template for a race-based approach that potentially sur-
vives an equal protection challenge.
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INTRODUCTION
The criminal system is a site of alarming, pervasive racial
harms.1 Twenty-four years ago, Professor Paul Butler proposed race-
based interventions to address these harms.2 In the absence of a
race-informed approach, he warned that race-neutral reform would
fail to disrupt these conditions.3 Twenty-four years later, the dis-
parities Butler sought to address persist.4 Scholars continue to
identify the inefficacy of race-neutral interventions and the need for
race-informed approaches.5 And yet, the feasibility of race-conscious
strategies is broadly dismissed.6 Looking out over the treacherous
1. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 34
(2019) (“Criminal punishment has been instrumental in reinstating the subjugated status of
black people.... [N]ot to give black people what they deserved, but to keep them in their
place.”); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J.1043, 1046-
47 (2019) (“Police respond to black and white suspects in different ways. So do judges and
prosecutors.... As a result, criminal justice elicits racial stratification.”); John Rappaport,
Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U.CHI.L.REV. 711, 711 (2020) (“The
American criminal justice system’s ills are by now so familiar as scarcely to bear repeating:
unprecedented levels of incarceration, doled out disproportionately across racial groups, and
police that seem to antagonize and hurt the now-distrustful communities they are tasked to
serve and protect.”); Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, 42 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 129-30 (2018) (“[I]nfluencing all aspects of our criminal justice
system is its vastly disparate impact, from arrest to incarceration, on African American as
well as Latino people.... African American people are incarcerated at 5.1 times the rate of
whites, and Latino people at 1.4 times the rate of whites at the state level.”). See generally
Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1187, 1189-91 (2018) (illustrating through empirical analysis that documented racial differ-
ences at the criminal justice system’s entry point (policing) and exit point (sentencing) also
exist throughout the system).
2. Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 843
(1997).
3. Id. at 857.
4. See Colleen Walsh, Solving Racial Disparities in Policing, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 23,
2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/02/solving-racial-disparities-in-policing/
[https://perma.cc/XTC3-2QCY]. Compare Butler, supra note 2, at 868 n.97 (“In 1994, for the
first time in American history, there were more African American men in prison than white
men.”), with John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is
Shrinking, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/30/
shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/J6QS-Z5ZE]
(stating that in 2017, there were still more Black inmates than white inmates in prison).
5. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits
of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425, 1445-46 (2016).
6. See e.g., Huq, supra note 1, at 1133.
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waters of equal protection jurisprudence, criminal law scholars
conclude that race-based remedies face insurmountable obstacles.7
The conclusion is understandable. Since Butler’s call for race-
informed reform, Supreme Court pronouncements have only become
more sweeping and definitive; for example, “the Constitution is not
violated by racial imbalance” and any institutional attempt to sim-
ply “achieve racial balance” would be “patently unconstitutional.”8
The Court made clear that whenever a public or federally funded
institution implements a race-based policy, strict scrutiny applies.9
Criminal system actors are not excepted from this requirement;
whether it is a police department attempting to diversify officer
ranks or a warden attempting to reduce the threat of prison riots,
these decisions are subject to the most searching constitutional re-
view.10
But a close look at strict scrutiny as applied in the criminal law
context reveals a pattern of judicial deference that is uncharacteris-
tic in, for example, higher education and employment spheres.11
Unlike the mixed record of educational institutions’ efforts to sur-
vive strict scrutiny,12 efforts of criminal system actors to implement
race-based remedies survive strict scrutiny challenges on a compar-
atively weaker showing.13 These successes within the criminal law
7. See id. (concluding a race-based remedy would face significant constitutional resis-
tance); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2240 & n.66 (2019)
(suggesting a race-based remedy might be foreclosed by strict scrutiny); Deborah Hellman,
Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 852-53 (2020) (stating that “set[ing]
different thresholds for the target trait for each racial group” is “legally prohibited”).
8. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11, 721,
723 (2007) (finding unconstitutional the school district’s efforts to address racial disparities).
9. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting “all racial
classifications” are subject to strict scrutiny and are “constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests”).
10. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502-03, 505-06 (2005); Detroit Police Officers’
Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 679, 694 (6th Cir. 1979).
11. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003), and Detroit Police Officers’
Ass’n, 608 F.2d at 679, 694, with Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1996).
12. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251 (rejecting race-based admission policy); Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 303, 312-13 (2013) (remanding case with directions
to apply a rigorous vetting of prior attempts to address stated interests through race-neutral
means).
13. E.g., Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920 (finding, based on outside experts’ representations and
despite the lack of empirical evidence or prior attempts to implement race-neutral remedies,
that inmate perceptions of operational fairness justified hiring Black supervisors).
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arena remain uncontroversial, if unnoticed, while battles over affir-
mative action in education and employment draw oxygen.14 Among
the institutions that have considered race-based remedies, criminal
system actors appear more favorably positioned to weather constitu-
tional scrutiny.15 What ultimately accounts for the “as applied”
exceptionalism in the criminal law context is unarticulated, but the
broadly observed judicial deference to the exercise of police and
prosecutor discretion seems to be at play, even within strict scrutiny
review.16
This Article seeks to unearth and clarify interests within the
criminal system that courts find compelling, and examines features
of criminal law that provide favorable conditions within strict scru-
tiny review. To anchor this constitutional analysis, this Article
addresses ongoing efforts to improve risk assessment tools. There
are a number of reasons to do so. Risk assessment instruments
(RAIs) are increasingly used by prosecutors, judges, and correction-
al personnel in making pretrial detention, charging, sentencing, and
supervision decisions.17 Intended to mitigate decision maker bias,
RAIs have been found to reproduce racial disparities.18 To better
appreciate challenges that jurisdictions face in addressing these
racial disparities, this Article presents a case study of Milwaukee
County, which has made nationally recognized efforts to address
14. See Louis Menand, The Changing Meaning of Affirmative Action, NEW YORKER (Jan.
13, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/20/have-we-outgrown-the-need-for-
affirmative-action [https://perma.cc/25FX-GE8N] (discussing the history and continued contro-
versy surrounding affirmative action in education and employment without once mentioning
affirmative action in the criminal system). Though difficult to prove a negative, where
scholarship analyzing strict scrutiny review within the employment and educational spheres
is robust, there is little scholarship discussing race-based remedies in the criminal law sphere.
See, e.g., Hina B. Shah, Radical Reconstruction: (Re) Embracing Affirmative Action in Private
Employment, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 203, 205-08 (2019); Robert A. Friedman, Affirmative Action
in Education, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 395, 396 (2007).
15. See Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
16. See Sarah Spiegel, Comment, Prison “Race Riots”: An Easy Case for Segregation?, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 2261, 2267-68, 2270, 2291-92 (2007).
17. Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61 & n.1 (2017)
(“Predictive technologies are spreading through the criminal justice system like wildfire.”).
18. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2222 (stating RAIs are “poised to entrench the inexcusable
racial disparity so characteristic of our justice system, and to dignify the cultural trope of
black criminality with the gloss of science”). Because racial disparities can be baked into the
data, the flawed data used by the tool can then generate flawed results. See Eaglin, supra note
17, at 72.
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racial inequities in its criminal system.19 Based on multiple studies
and stakeholder interviews, the challenges in Milwaukee County
put in full relief the importance of the option to implement race-
based remedies.20
This Article also proposes a race-based remedy particularly well-
suited to address racial disparities reproduced by RAIs. The pro-
posed remedy emerges from the rich scholarship discussing RAIs
and the insights of Professor Sandra Mayson, who recognized that
because RAIs are data-informed, they are susceptible to a statistical
analysis that permits racial disparities to be numerically express-
ed.21 The proposed remedy can be described as a “racial disparity
cap”: a jurisdiction would assess the mean risk score of racial groups
and subtract any differential from the scores of individual members
of burdened racial groups. Clearly, the “racial disparity cap” is race-
based. Virtually all scholars in this area fear that such attempts
would fail under a strict scrutiny analysis.22 This Article, however,
finds reasons to be optimistic about how the remedy fares under
equal protection constraints.
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, it provides essential
background to understanding RAIs, presents a case study of a
jurisdiction that has struggled to use race-neutral approaches to
mitigate racial disparities reproduced by its RAI, and proposes a
race-based remedy that would significantly reduce racial harms
associated with the use of RAIs. In Part II, this Article articulates
a compelling interest available to criminal system stakeholders
that, applied within existing constitutional constraints, provides a
way forward for jurisdictions to survive equal protection challenges.




21. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2222, 2224.
22. See e.g., Huq, supra note 1, at 1133; Mayson, supra note 7, at 2240 & n.66; Hellman,
supra note 7, at 853.
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I. RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM
Racial disparities remain in jurisdictions that have launched
race-neutral reform.23 This dynamic is particularly on display in
jurisdictions that adopt RAIs to mitigate racial bias, and then seek
to mitigate the racial disparities that RAIs reproduce.24 Illustrating
this dynamic, Milwaukee County adopted a nationally prevalent
RAI to reduce racial bias in pretrial detention hearings,25 a signifi-
cant decision point; studies show outcomes are significantly worse
for detained defendants, compared to similarly situated defendants
who are released.26 Before examining Milwaukee’s particular expe-
rience with RAIs, it is worth assessing the promise and perils of
RAIs generally.
A. The Promise and Perils of Risk Assessment Tools
Increasingly, Big Data influences criminal system outcomes.27
Algorithms burrow through data to predict recidivism—how likely
is it that a criminal defendant will re-offend?28 To predict that like-
lihood, risk tools rely on data points, like a person’s criminal history,
23. See MARC MAUER & NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENT’G PROJECT, INCORPORATING RACIAL
EQUITY INTO CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2-3 (2014), https://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/05/incorporating-racial-equity-into-criminal-justice-reform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WKT7-D4SP].
24. See id. at 12.
25. See infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
26. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 717 (2017); Megan T. Stevenson,
Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 511, 511-12, 516 (2018).
27. See Mayson, supra note 7, at 2221-22; Eaglin, supra note 17, at 61 & n.1; Huq, supra
note 1, at 1052 (observing RAIs in criminal justice will “soon become pervasive”); Shima
Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 176-77 (2013). See
generally Christopher Slobogin, A Defence of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing, in PREDICTIVE
SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 107-08 (Jan W. de Keijser et al.
eds., 2019) (providing history of risk assessment development).
28. See Eaglin, supra note 17, at 73-78 (observing varied approaches to the sourcing of
algorithms (data that will be used) and choices that inform algorithm architecture (how data
is weighted and what definition of “recidivism” is used)); Huq, supra note 1, at 1060 (observing
that tools apply “an automated protocol to a large volume of data to classify new subjects in
terms of the probability of expected criminal activity and in relation to the application of state
coercion”).
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age of first arrest, affiliation with felons, education level, work
history, frequency of moving residences, and missed court hear-
ings.29 Some tools use a constellation of data points, some use just
a few.30 Different tools might weigh similar factors differently.31
Some tools require personal interviews, while some rely on pre-
existing data.32 Some tools are specifically designed to aid in pretrial
decision-making, while others might be designed to assist a judge
during the sentencing phase.33 Algorithms reduce information to
29. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1400 (2011) (noting data used by the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide includes whether offender lived with biological parents up to
age 16, the offender’s age, marital status, elementary school maladjustment, and history of
alcohol use); Brian J. Ostrom & Neal B. Kauder, The Evolution of Offender Risk Assessment
in Virginia, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 163 (2013) (noting Virginia Criminal Sentencing
Commission’s risk tool considers offender’s gender, employment status, felony record, current
offense type, additional offenses at time of conviction, record of arrest or confinement in past
eighteen months, and criminal adult record); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and
the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 812-13 (2014) (noting
the Level of Services Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) tool considers subjective factors such as
performance and interactions at work, dependence on social assistance, and personal atti-
tudes).
30. See Eaglin, supra note 17, at 81-82.
31. See, e.g., id. at 82 (noting how data points related to criminal history, such as with the
LSI-R, are afforded greater weight when the same event may be counted more than once by
asking about “prior adult convictions, arrests, charges, parole violations, and other official
records of violence”); Ostrom & Kauder, supra note 29, at 163 (noting each factor of the
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission’s risk tool “receives a risk score commensurate
with its contribution to the prediction of reconviction”).
32. E.g., Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Chal-
lenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 238 (2015) (noting that LSI-R risk assessment tool gathers
its information from a “semistructured interview and review of available file information”);
Kevin S. Douglas & Kim A. Reeves, Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20 (HCR-20)
Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Rationale, Application, and Empirical Overview, in
HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 147, 157 (Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds.,
2010) (describing the Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20 tool, or HCR-20, that gathers
its information from a review of files, an interview with the offender, psychological testing,
interviews with people who know the offender, and general observation). 





[https://perma.cc/8S3M-FFTQ] (discussing a tool designed to aid in pretrial release); Huq,
supra note 1, at 1075-76 (noting Virginia Sentencing Commission’s use of its risk tool to divert
“nonviolent, low-risk offenders to alternative punishments such as probation, jail time, and
restitution” and the use of the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions tool, or COMPAS, in the sentencing context); Douglas & Reeves, supra note 32, at
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numerical values, but the tools’ results are commonly expressed in
terms of low, medium, or high risk.34 The meaning of these terms
can vary across jurisdictions; for example, low risk to one jurisdic-
tion might be medium risk in another. An aspiration is that a vali-
dated, algorithmic analysis will mitigate decision maker bias.35
These tools also promise to reduce recidivism by assessing “risk,
need, and responsivity” to determine the appropriate “level of cor-
rectional intervention.”36
As jurisdictions increasingly adopted RAIs, an impressive body of
criticism also emerged.37
1. Criticism That Tools Attribute Risk to Individuals
For the typical decision maker, the RAI answers, “what is this
defendant’s risk score?”; however, tools ultimately predict the aver-
age likelihood of recidivism for individuals who share a characteris-
tic.38 Data used by the RAI also reflects characteristics that are
attributed to a defendant and not reflective of a defendant’s exercise
of agency.39 Risk levels are determined by “characteristics and
150-51 (noting use of HCR-20 in the contexts of monitoring individuals who are incarcerated,
institutionalized, or under community supervision, and also in making release decisions).
34. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS. OFF., AN OVERVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK ASSESSMENT 14 (2018) [hereinafter AOUSC
OVERVIEW].
35. See id. at 4; Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities
in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 77 (2015) (revealing that in removing an
external constraint (the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), there were “significantly increased
racial disparities” in sentencing decisions).
36. AOUSC OVERVIEW, supra note 34, at 3; accord Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neo-
rehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 215 (2013). This “risk, need, and responsivity” approach
finds robust support in publications seeking institutional acceptance. See, e.g., CRIMINOLOGY,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17459125 [https://perma.cc/W63C-LL94] (“devoted to
the study of crime and deviant behavior”); CRIME & DELINQ., https://journals.sagepub.com
home/cad [https://perma.cc/P9PR-LBD2] (research on “victims, criminals, courts and sanc-
tions”); CRIM.JUST.&BEHAV., https://journals.sagepub.com/home/cjb [https://perma.cc/ Z5Y2-
TCWE] (designed “to help the correctional professional develop successful programs”); J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY, https://www.springer.com/journal/11292 [https://perma.cc/
26EE-MWYV] (committed to “the development of evidence based crime and justice policy”).
37. Starr, supra note 29, at 817-21; Slobogin, supra note 27, at 107.
38. Starr, supra note 29, at 842.
39. See Dawinder Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 702-09 (2015)
(criticizing the tying of punishment to group membership and factors beyond the individual’s
control).
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circumstances statistically associated with an increased chance of
recidivism.”40 In doing so, RAIs often consider factors over which a
defendant has no control, for example, having family members with
a felony, a socio-economic status, or being part of a particular racial
group.41 Reliance on RAI factors also limits the universe of risk
factors; an RAI may not measure “lack of self-esteem,” but “self-
esteem issues can and do occasionally lead to serious violence.”42 A
tool can assign risk that, upon closer evaluation, is not there be-
cause information is stale or incorrect.43 Even if a decision maker is
made aware of such an error, making an adjustment is not possible.
A decision maker has no way of considering updated information
within the tool; such an attempt would threaten the assessment’s
validity.44 These criticisms, all fair, are not limited to RAIs, but also
reflect human decision-making: we rely on stereotypes and incom-
plete information to assess others.45
2. Criticism About What Tools Measure
Critics question what the data and tools actually measure.46 For
example, does a tool measure what it purports to measure—the
likelihood a defendant will engage in criminal conduct—or the like-
lihood of being caught?47 This distinction matters in a jurisdiction
40. AOUSC OVERVIEW, supra note 34, at 4 (emphasis added). The National Council on
Crime & Delinquency (NCCD) warns about conflating individual and group characteristics:
“[a] general statistical relationship between a need and recidivism does not mean that need
is ‘criminogenic’ for an individual offender.” CHRIS BAIRD, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQ., CRIMINOGENIC NEEDS 2 (2017), http://www.evidentchange.org/sites/default/files/
criminogenic_needs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9V6-TLDQ].
41. See Sidhu, supra note 39, at 675 & n.24.
42. BAIRD, supra note 40, at 3.
43. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH.U.L.REV. 1109,
1156 (2017) (“[T]he heightened risk factor for being an unemployed high school dropout might
be remedied by a career training program. The risks can change, but the lists of risk-
associated people might not, distorting even the correlative accuracy of the prediction.”).
44. See generally Bo Cowgill & Megan T. Stevenson, Algorithmic Social Engineering, 110
AEA PAPERS & PROC. 96, 96, 99-100 (2020) (discussing how a decision maker attempting to
compensate for a perceived flaw in the risk tool will distort the result).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing,
15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 584 (2018).
47. See Sheldon X. Zhang, Robert E. L. Roberts & David Farabee, An Analysis of Prisoner
Reentry and Parole Risk Using COMPAS and Traditional Criminal History Measures, 60
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that over-surveils Black versus white persons; if the tool identifies
Black persons to have a higher risk of recidivism, the tool is
accurate only so far as it reflects the likelihood of unlawful behavior
being detected by discriminatory policing practices.48
3. Criticism About What Type of Recidivism Is Being Detected
To the extent an assessment may predict whether a person may
recidivate, it does not indicate “how they are likely to recidivate,” for
example, whether it will be the commission of “a serious offense or
a low-level drug or property crime.”49 Tools thus tell stakeholders
little about what institutional consequence most effectively serves
to reduce that recidivism.50
4. Criticism About Lack of Transparency
Companies with proprietary software have guarded against legal
challenges to look under the hood.51 Details about data collection,
data use, and the weight attributed to data points can remain in a
“black box.”52 Without crucial efforts by stakeholders to uncover
“data collection methods, weaknesses, and gaps” and attempts to
“understand[ ] the challenges associated with inputting and
analyzing the data,” a jurisdiction’s criminal “system runs the risk
of being built on an unknown and unknowable database.”53
CRIME & DELINQ. 167, 184 (2014).
48. See Michael Brenner, Jeannie Suk Gersen, Michael Haley, Matthew Lin, Amil
Merchant, Richard Jagdishwar Millett, Suproteem Sarkar & Drew Wegner, Constitutional
Dimensions of Predictive Algorithms in Criminal Justice, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 267, 275
(2020) (noting the data relied upon by these tools reflect “discriminatory policing and the
financial impact of structural racism”); Zhang et al., supra note 47, at 184 (stating “[r]earrests
are more reflective of police activities than of the offender’s actual criminal involvement” and
“official records are an imprecise proxy for actual criminal activity, which COMPAS was
designed to predict”).
49. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 65 (2018); see also, Cecelia Klingele,
The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 576
(2015).
50. See Starr, supra note 29, at 855.
51. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1350-53 (2018).
52. Ferguson, supra note 43, at 1165.
53. Id. at 1165-66.
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5. Criticism That Tools Insulate Unfair Practices
Risk tools were intended to facilitate “impartiality, predictability,
and rationality” and mitigate discriminatory decision-making.54 Yet,
there is no empirical indication that RAIs provide significantly dif-
ferent outcomes than humans, which one would expect if the tool
was corrective.55 Tools thus threaten to reproduce pathologies under
a veneer of objective fairness. Similar to the reorganization of
worthless loans into averaged-out tranches of collateralized debt
that are then validated by credit rating agencies, risk assessment
tools repackage flawed inputs to promise predictable, fair, and cost-
effective criminal justice.56 Professor Cecelia Klingele suggests
reformers suspecting this result nevertheless adopted RAIs because
“they promise financial savings, increased efficiency, and ‘scientifi-
cally proven’ results.”57 Even proponents of these tools acknowledge
the potential for data to embed error, but proclaim optimism in the
ability to reduce bias over time and, at worst, maintain the status
quo.58
6. Criticism About Racial Harms
The explicit use of race as a risk factor in RAIs is no longer
permitted.59 Nevertheless, race-neutral data points serve as proxies
for racial discrimination.60 The data point most predictive of
54. See Klingele, supra note 49, at 562.
55. See Starr, supra note 29, at 851.
56. See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 1124-25; Klingele, supra note 49, at 539; see also John
Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT BY
THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE 77, 79, 94 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
57. Klingele, supra note 49, at 567; accord AOUSCOVERVIEW, supra note 34, at 4 (“[A]ctu-
arial devices in combination with professional judgement are generally more accurate and
consistent than professional judgment alone.”).
58. See Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks Out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21 J.L.
& POL’Y 5, 19 (2012) (“Algorithms also have the capacity to improve the quality of predictive
judgments, and they are particularly valuable in taming the biases that can flow from inter-
view situations, where first impressions often overpower other important data.”).
59. Eaglin, supra note 36, at 215.
60. See Mayson, supra note 7, at 2222; Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The
Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015); Ferguson, supra note 43,
at 1148; Eaglin, supra note 36, at 215-16. This is further complicated by the fact that some of
these proxies for racial discrimination, such as criminal history, are among the strongest
predictors of recidivism. See Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis
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recidivism—criminal history—is especially susceptible to being
shaped by discriminatory practices.61 Professor Sonja Starr takes a
more expansive view, arguing “the use of demographic, socioeco-
nomic, family, and neighborhood variables ... amounts to overt dis-
crimination based on demographics and socioeconomic status.”62
Where there is consensus that disparate policing practices distort
data, there is less agreement about whether or how to credit the
impact of structural racism on data.63
Racially discriminatory policing practices include over-surveil-
lance and constant detentions and searches in neighborhoods of
color.64 Despite much lower returns of contraband and weapons in
searches of Black persons vis-à-vis white persons,65 the dispropor-
tionate number of citations and arrests of Black people results from
police saturation and expanded police discretion in communities of
color.66 Compounding the profusion of misdemeanor-level arrests in
of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 588 (1996).
61. See Harcourt, supra note 60, at 237; BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 111-16 (2007); Jennifer L. Skeem
& Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate
Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 683-84, 704-05 (2016) (noting correlation between race and
criminal history); Mayson, supra note 7, at 2229.
62. Starr, supra note 29, at 806; accord CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION:
HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 25-26 (2017) (asserting
that an RAI that considers convictions, past police involvement, and whether the defendant
has friends and family with criminal records is destined to produce racial disparity in results).
63. See Harcourt, supra note 60, at 240-41 (criticizing RAI data given policing practices
that target racial groups and the disproportionate imprisonment of persons of color); Ngozi
Okidegbe, When They Hear Us: Race, Algorithms and the Practice of Criminal Law, 29 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 332 (2020) (“[M]embers of historically marginalized communities are
arrested at higher rates than their white counterparts due to racial profiling.”).
64. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2183 (2013) (“The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in
receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.”).
65. See, e.g., Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in the
Criminal Justice System, SENT’G PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/black-lives-matter-eliminating-racial-inequity-in-the-criminal-justice-system/
[https://perma.cc/Q2KQ-MRUP].
66. See Walsh, supra note 4. For case law on furtive glances and high crime areas, see
Chan Tov McNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police Communication and Existing
While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 346-47 (2019); Jamelia N. Morgan, Rethinking
Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 43-45); Devon W.
Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J.
1479, 1483 (2016); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
43, 71-74 (2009).
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communities of color, statutory schemes often convert multiple mis-
demeanors into felonies, manufacturing risk that is then imported
by RAIs.67 A destructive cycle serves to justify these conditions—
“[t]he targeting of certain areas or certain races creates the
impression of higher crime rates in those areas, which then justifies
continued police presence there.”68
It is within this (growing) body of criticism that jurisdictions
weigh RAI options.69 For a jurisdiction seeking to flatten sentencing
swings among its judges and to reduce bias in decision-making,
RAIs seem promising.70 As to the concerns that RAIs reproduce
racial disparities, jurisdictions tend to consider race-neutral tweaks
that are ultimately ineffective.71 Milwaukee, for example, adopted
an RAI in 2011.72 After a decade of attempts to mitigate racial
disparities, they remain.
67. See Misdemeanor Justice: Statutory Guidance for Sentencing, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 16, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/mis-
demeanor-justice-statutory-guidance-for-sentencing.aspx#Habitual%20Offending
[https://perma.cc/KQ3W-HKP2] (discussing habitual offender laws, which “apply to those who
have been convicted multiple times, even if each incident is a misdemeanor”). For example,
a repeat offender in Wisconsin includes “someone convicted of any misdemeanor on three
separate occasions over a five-year period. If someone is a repeater, then a maximum term of
imprisonment of one year or less may be increased to up to two years of incarceration.” Id.
68. Ferguson, supra note 43, at 1148-49; accord Aaron Cantú, Algorithms and Future
Crimes: Welcome to the Racial Profiling of the Future, SAN DIEGO FREE PRESS (Mar. 1, 2014),
https://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/03/algorithms-and-future-crimes-welcome-to-the-racial-
profiling-of-the-future/#.YHXf6ehKhPY [https://perma.cc/QE5F-6B3A] (“Any attempt to pre-
dict future criminality will be based on the crime rates of the past.... If that’s the reality that
is supposed to inform who we criminalize in the future, won’t initiatives like predictive
policing just perpetuate the racist criminal justice policies and practices of the present?”);
Bryan Llenas, Brave New World of ‘Predictive Policing’ Raises Specter of High-Tech Racial
Profiling, FOX NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/world/brave-new-world-of-
predictive-policing-raises-specter-of-high-tech-racial-profiling [https://perma.cc/HXY7-3CA9]
(“The algorithm is telling you exactly what you programmed it to tell you. ‘Young black kids
in the south side of Chicago are more likely to commit crimes,’ and the algorithm lets the
police launder this belief.... [I]f the data is biased to begin with and based on human judg-
ment, then the results the algorithm is going to spit out will reflect those biases.”).
69. See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 1152-53, 1157.
70. See id. at 1117.
71. See id. at 1152.
72. 21 Cities, States Adopt Risk Assessment Tool to Help Judges Decide Which Defendants
to Detain Prior to Trial, ARNOLD VENTURES (June 26, 2015), https://www.arnoldventures.org/
newsroom/more-than-20-cities-and-states-adopt-risk-assessment-tool-to-helpjudges-decide-
which-defendants-to-detain-prior-to-trial/ [https://perma.cc/2SMR-Y46J].
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B. A Case Study: Milwaukee County
Milwaukee County occupies a portion of southeast Wisconsin.73
The City of Milwaukee, situated on the shores of Lake Michigan,
experienced an influx of Black migrants in the 1950s.74 The city was
already racially segregated; twenty years earlier, the federal govern-
ment’s redlining policy deemed Black persons a financial threat to
white residents, laying ruin to Black neighborhoods.75 Milwaukee is
now the most segregated city in the United States.76 Three out of
every four Black residents in Milwaukee would have to move to
achieve integration.77
Though Milwaukee County is over 60 percent white,78 when view-
ing Milwaukee’s criminal courts, county jails, and probation offices,
one is struck by how people of color are subject to a system run by
white people.79 Wisconsin has one of the highest incarceration
73. Milwaukee, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (July 1, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/
place/Milwaukee [https://perma.cc/H78G-CPEC].
74. See id.; Peoples, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILWAUKEE, https://emke.uwm.edu/peoples [https://
perma.cc/7GYU-4V7R].
75. See Ashley Luthern, In One of America’s Most Segregated Cities, There’s Unequal
Violence and Unequal Justice, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 10, 2019), https://projects.
jsonline.com/news/2019/7/10/murder-in-milwaukee-segregation-shapes-racial-disparities-and-
crime.html [https://perma.cc/R7K9-R8FV].
76. German Lopez, Milwaukee’s Riot Didn’t Happen in a Vacuum. It Happened in the US’s
Most Segregated City., VOX (Aug. 15, 2016, 12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/15/
12480930/milwaukee-riots-race-segregation-police [https://perma.cc/UH2X-TREA].
77. William H. Frey, Black-White Segregation Edges Downward Since 2000, Census





78. QuickFacts: Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/milwaukeecountywisconsin [https://perma.cc/89WS-PHU2].
79. Observations of author, serving as assigned counsel for the Wisconsin Public Defender
(2008-2009) and a Supervising Attorney at the Wisconsin Innocence Project (2010-2014); cf.
Michele L. Jawando & Allie Anderson, Racial and Gender Diversity Sorely Lacking in
America’s Courts, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/courts/news/2016/09/15/144287/racial-and-gender-diversity-sorely-lacking-
in-americas-courts/ [https://perma.cc/4L73-SRHP]; Dan Keating & Kevin Uhrmacher, In
Urban Areas, Police Are Consistently Much Whiter than the People They Serve, WASH. POST
(June 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/04/urban-areas-police-are-
consistently-much-whiter-than-people-they-serve/ [https://perma.cc/N859-W4EA]; Bailiffs,
Correctional Officers, & Jailers, DATAUSA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/ bailiffs-correctional-
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rates of Black persons in the nation, second only to South Dakota.80
Of Wisconsin’s fifty-six Black neighborhoods—“defined as ‘a certain
area where the majority of residents are African Americans’”
—thirty-one are actually jails or prisons.81 Wisconsin’s rate of
incarcerating Black people is almost twice the national average.82
Nationally, for every one white person imprisoned, five Black
individuals are imprisoned; in Wisconsin, that ratio is one to ten.83
Milwaukee County drives this disparity: Milwaukee County is home
to 76 percent of the state’s Black population.84 More than half of
Milwaukee’s Black “men in their thirties ha[ve] served time in state
prison.”85
The apartheid apparent, Milwaukee stakeholders nevertheless
needed empirical evidence before concluding racial discrimination
was afoot in the county’s criminal system.86 “You can’t change what
officers-jailers [https://perma.cc/Y5Q3-EJ4G] (“57.2% of [b]ailiffs, correctional officers, &
jailers are White (Non-Hispanic), making that the most common race or ethnicity in the
occupation.”); Probation Officers & Correctional Treatment Specialists, DATA USA, https://
datausa.io/profile/soc/probation-officers-correctional-treatment-specialists [https://perma.cc/
8MB3-A449] (“54.1% of [p]robation officers & correctional treatment specialists are White
(Non-Hispanic), making that the most common race or ethnicity in the occupation.”).
80. See Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration by Race
and Ethnicity, SENT’G PROJECT (July 2007), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Uneven-Justice-State-Rates-of-Incarceration-by-Race-and-Ethnicity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JCU-RUTZ]. Only 20,000 Black people reside in South Dakota, compared
to 390,000 in Wisconsin. Compare QuickFacts: South Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/SD [https://perma.cc/D5P6-CN3B], with QuickFacts:
Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/WI
[https://perma.cc/PG8L-6NEF].
81. Brentin Mock, Half of Wisconsin’s Black Neighborhoods Are Jails, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Aug. 9, 2016, 3:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-09/half-
of-wisconsin-s-black-neighborhoods-are-jails [https://perma.cc/MCZ8-XG9Z].
82. See Mauer & King, supra note 80.
83. See id.
84. Wisconsin’s Racial and Ethnic Diversity: Census 2000 Population & Percentages, U.
WIS.EXTENSION &APPLIED POPULATION LAB’Y (2001), https://blogs.extension.wisc.edu/wacec/
files/2014/12/WACEC_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP66-UU39].
85. Toobin, supra note 19.
86. See id. There was concern by some stakeholders who sought to escape accountability
that these racial disparities were traceable to actions by police and prosecutors, as opposed
to “deeply entrenched negative indices in relation to poverty, segregation, poor health out-
comes, unemployment and poor educational outcomes.” Prosecution and Race in the Criminal
Justice System—Milwaukee’s Experience, UNIV. WIS.-MADISON SOC. SCI. COMPUTING COOP.,
https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/soc/wiscidea/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/PROSECUTION-AND-
RACE-IN-THE-CRIMINAL-JUSTICE-SYSTEM.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QUA-EYH6]
[hereinafter Prosecution and Race].
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you don’t measure,” stated Milwaukee District Attorney John
Chisholm.87 In 2005, the Milwaukee District Attorney granted ac-
cess to the Vera Institute of Justice to review departmental files.88
Some of the findings include:
[P]rosecutors in Milwaukee declined to prosecute forty-one per
cent of whites arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia,
compared with twenty-seven per cent of blacks; in cases involv-
ing prostitution, black female defendants were likelier to be
charged than white defendants; in cases that involved resisting
or obstructing an officer, most of the defendants charged were
black (seventy-seven percent).89
The Vera study indicated that prosecutorial racial bias com-
pounded police racial bias; for example, though marijuana use does
not differentiate by race, Black people in Wisconsin are “six times
more likely to be arrested” for possession than white people.90 And
yet, prosecutors were around 50 percent more likely to decline
bringing possession charges against white persons than Black per-
sons.91 Other disparities surfaced. Of non-domestic violence (DV)
felony and misdemeanor cases in 2007, 33 percent of the caseload
was white, while 66 percent was nonwhite.92 If white people faced
similar conditions as nonwhite Milwaukee citizens, annual cases
against white people would increase from 8,000 to 30,000.93 If white
people were subject to the same conditions as nonwhite people, the
total non-DV caseload in Milwaukee would increase from 24,500
87. Harvard Law School, Vera Conference at HLS: Panel on Challenges and Opportunities
faced by Offices of the DA, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
o2I1zLTqhMo&feature=emb_logo [https://perma.cc/NWD2-CNGY]. This was a statement
repeated by the Vera Institute of Justice. See Prosecution and Race, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. Toobin, supra note 19.
90. Michael M. O’Hear, Arrest Trends in Milwaukee, 1980-2011—Part One, MARQ. UNIV.
L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (June 30, 2013), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2013/06/arrest-
trends-in-milwaukee-1980-2011-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/KNN8-DHPY].
91. See Toobin, supra note 19.
92. See Wayne McKenzie, Don Stemen, Derek Coursen & Elizabeth Farid, Prosecution
and Racial Justice: Using Data to Advance Fairness in Criminal Prosecution, VERA INST.JUST.
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cases to 47,000.94 Milwaukee County stakeholders concluded these
racial disparities had anchors in policing and prosecution practices
influenced by unconscious racial bias.95 Some still wondered, how-
ever, if racial disparities—say, in arrest rates—resulted because
police were “merely responding to different rates of crime-commis-
sion among different racial groups.”96 A Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
study indicated racial bias, not (racist assertions of) race-based
behavior, was the culprit.97
In 2011, Milwaukee stakeholders sought to address disparities by
improving the RAIs used during pretrial detention hearings.98 A
pretrial detention hearing determines much.99 Pretrial detention
significantly contributes to Wisconsin’s jail population; in 2013, pre-
trial detainees held in local jails outnumbered those who had
already been convicted.100 Pretrial detention is not only correlated
with race, but also poverty; in Milwaukee, a 2009 study found that
23 percent of jail inmates were serving pretrial detention because
they could not post bail of $500 or less.101 Studies across the nation
confirm the importance of this pretrial disposition.102 Pretrial
detainees held for two to three days are 40 percent more likely to
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See O’Hear, supra note 90. This view ensures that, irrespective of studies, racial
disparities will persist.
97. Ben Poston, Racial Gap Found in Traffic Stops in Milwaukee, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Dec. 3, 2011), https://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/racial-gap-
found-in-traffic-stops-in-milwaukee-ke1hsip-134977408.html/ [https://perma.cc/E8TE-TA4A]
(finding also that searches of Black and white drivers resulted in similar rates of contraband
hits).
98. See ARNOLD VENTURES, supra note 72.
99. In Wisconsin, a defendant who is arrested is eligible for release “under reasonable
conditions designed to assure his or her appearance in court, protect members of the commu-
nity from serious bodily harm, or prevent the intimidation of witnesses. Bail [a requirement
to post a bond] may be imposed ... [if a court finds] a reasonable basis to believe that bail is
necessary to assure appearance.” WIS. STAT. § 969.01 (2021).
100. See Wisconsin Profile, PRISON POL’YINITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/
WI.html [https://perma.cc/3B7B-WGUF].
101. See Milwaukee County’s Pretrial Release Decision Process & Pretrial Services Re-
Design, MILWAUKEE CNTY. CMTY. JUST. COUNCIL 3 (July 24, 2013), https://www.
milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cjcouncil/2013JulyCJCCPresentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZ9V-7AL2] [hereinafter Pretrial Release Decision Process].
102. See generally Léon Digard & Elizabeth Swavola, Justice Denied: The Harmful and
Lasting Effects of Pretrial Detention, VERAINST.JUST. (Apr. 2019), https://vera.org/downloads/
publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9P6-HFMZ].
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commit a new crime compared to a similar cohort of defendants held
for no longer than twenty-four hours, a stunning pattern given that
detention is often justified on public safety grounds.103 Pretrial
detention increases a defendant’s likelihood of conviction and sever-
ity of any sentence.104 Where release significantly increases the
likelihood of case dismissal,105 detention correlates to a higher like-
lihood of conviction: in a study of a general cross-section of defen-
dants, more than three days of pretrial detention increased the
likelihood of conviction by 13 percent;106 and, in a study of misde-
meanor cases, persons detained were 25 percent more likely to be
convicted than similarly situated persons who were released.107
Pretrial detention also correlates to sentence severity.108 In a study
of misdemeanor defendants, those detained were 43 percent more
likely to serve time than similarly situated persons who were re-
leased;109 and, in a study of felony cases, those subject to pretrial
detention served on average five months more than those released
(as to those released, 20 percent were sentenced to incarceration,
whereas 87 percent of those detained were so sentenced).110
Underscoring the significance of this decision point, even if a defen-
dant is released, a court has discretion to impose restrictions that
can have serious collateral consequences.111
103. See Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand & Alexander Holsinger, The
Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, ARNOLD FOUND. 20 (Nov. 2013), https://craftmedia
bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PX7G-N6BC].
104. Digard & Swavola, supra note 102, at 1. Pretrial detention obviously increases
prosecutorial leverage. See id. at 4-5. When a person with familial responsibilities is faced
with the prospect of pretrial detention, the person is incentivized to immediately plea to minor
charges, minimizing any consultation with a defense attorney, and creating or contributing
to criminal history, all regardless of innocence or guilt. See id.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Stevenson, supra note 26, at 532.
107. Heaton et al., supra note 26, at 717.
108. See Mary T. Phillips, A Decade of Bail Research in New York City, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST.
AGENCY, INC. 104-05 (Aug. 2012), https://www.prisonpolicy.org./scans/DecadeBailResearch
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8JE-E8P4].
109. Heaton et al., supra note 26, at 717.
110. Phillips, supra note 108, at 118, 121 (stating “the strongest single factor influencing”
this differential is pretrial detention). Those released have the opportunity to work and
support family, permitting a defense attorney to make arguments to mitigate sentencing. Id.
at 118.
111. See, e.g., Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641,
644-46 (2019).
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Recognizing the importance of this phase, stakeholders reformat-
ted the Milwaukee County Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument
(MCPRAI).112 The MCPRAI used six data points deemed predictive
of failure to appear, including the number of cases filed against a
defendant and whether the defendant was arrested while on bond;
both are factors that can reproduce racial disparity.113 Scoring was
applied to a grid, which, based on the charge, assigned risk.114 For
defendants deemed appropriate for release, the grid recommended
the bond amount, level of supervision (none, standard, or intensive),
and conditions upon release.115
The MCPRAI was intended to improve racial equity; according to
Chief Judge Jeffrey Kremers, the “old approach of relying entirely
on experience and local custom often leads to institutional biases
that leave disproportionately more poor and minority defendants
awaiting trial in jail.”116 Judge Kremers observed: “Certainly [in]
Milwaukee, minorities are a higher percentage of the ‘poor’ and
hence a higher percentage of the detained pretrial-defendant
112. Jeffrey A. Kremers, Milwaukee Moves Away from Money Bail System, WIS.LAW.(June
1, 2017), https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?
Volume=90&Issue=6&ArticleID=25667 [https://perma.cc/KL64-TQGW]; see also Milwaukee
County Pretrial Risk Assesssment Instrument—Revised (MCPRAI-R), MILWAUKEE CNTY.,
http://ebdmoneless.org/documents/Milwaukee-MCPRAI-Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4D3-
VUEB] [hereinafter MCPRAI-R Form] (showing that the risk factors considered are: the
number of cases filed against the defendant, prior failure to appear in court, whether the
defendant was arrested while out on bond, employment or primary caregiver status, amount
of time living at residence, and substance abuse score).
113. MCPRAI-R Form, supra note 112; see Beth Schwartzapfel, Can Racist Algorithms Be
Fixed? MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2019/07/01/can-racist-algorithms-be-fixed [https://perma.cc/J3JG-2GDJ].
114. Pretrial Release Decision Process, supra note 101, at 7-8.
115. Id. These conditions can include no contact orders, drug tests, curfews, and electronic
monitoring. Kremers, supra note 112. To decrease missed court dates, many jurisdictions are
testing new solutions, such as reminders sent through text messaging. Jason Tashea, Text-
Message Reminders Are a Cheap and Effective Way to Reduce Pretrial Detention, ABA J. (July
17, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www/abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/text_messages_can_
keep_people_out_of_jail [https://perma.cc/APK4-38SJ]. A study in New York found that using
a texting service to encourage attendance at hearings reduced failure to appear (FTAs) by 26
percent (the efficacy of such a program relies on certain factors, such as number of texts,
information included in texts, and whether the jurisdiction has the defendant’s phone
number). Id.
116. Bruce Vielmetti, Milwaukee County’s New Pretrial Release System Takes Hit,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/
pretrial-release-system-takes-hit-tp40r57-138459384.html [https://perma.cc/R4K3-B7X2].
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population. It is possible then to see the beginnings of what has
contributed to the racial disparities in jail populations.”117
In 2015, to further encourage pretrial release and achieve racial
equity, Milwaukee County transitioned to the Public Safety Assess-
ment (PSA) tool developed by Arnold Ventures.118 In Judge Kremers’
opinion, the PSA did not “consider factors that could be discrimina-
tory, such as race, sex, level of education, socioeconomic status, and
neighborhood.”119 The PSA is designed to predict the likelihood that
releasing a defendant will result in three outcomes: (1) a “failure to
appear (FTA)” for a court hearing; (2) a “new criminal arrest
(NCA)”; and (3) a “new violent criminal arrest (NVCA).”120 Arnold
Ventures claims the PSA is associated with “higher rates of pretrial
release” with no negative effect on “crime or court appearance
rates.”121 To inform its data set, the PSA draws on 750,000 cases in
300 different jurisdictions.122 To minimize racial disparities, the PSA
limits its data points to nine factors that “most effectively predict
the likelihood of successful pretrial outcomes.”123 The PSA is
transparent about how data points are weighted and calculated.124
The PSA is continuously evaluated to improve accuracy and “mini-
mize its impact on racial disparities.”125 Evaluations have yet to
show the PSA to “exacerbate racial disparities.”126
As the DA’s office and the courts tried to make RAIs more fair,
policing practices worked against these efforts.127 Compared to white
drivers, Black drivers were seven times more likely, and Latino
117. Kremers, supra note 112.
118. ARNOLD VENTURES, supra note 72.
119. Kremers, supra note 112.
120. Public Safety Assessment: How it Works, supra note 33, at 2-4.
121. About the Public Safety Assessment: What Is the PSA?, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y &
RSCH. (May 2020), https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/about/ [https://perma.cc/6S8V-RZ4J].
122. Id.
123. Id. The factors are: (1) age at current arrest; (2) current violent offense; (3) pending
charge at the time of the arrest; (4) prior misdemeanor conviction; (5) prior felony conviction;
(6) prior violent conviction; (7) prior failure to appear in the past two years; (8) prior failure
to appear older than two years; and (9) prior sentence to incarceration. Public Safety
Assessment: How it Works, supra note 33.
124. About the Public Safety Assessment: What Is the PSA?, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Poston, supra note 97.
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drivers five times more likely, to be subject to a traffic stop.128 In
2015, police “conducted 196,434 traffic and pedestrian stops,” a
number “staggering in light of the City’s ... population of 599,498.”129
Mitigating some of these racial harms, in 2015, the DA’s office
ceased prosecutions for possession of drug paraphernalia and re-
duced prosecutions for low-level drug offenses that disproportion-
ately impacted the Black population.130 In 2018, in response to
Collins v. City of Milwaukee, the police department agreed to a
settlement to “end practices amounting to a decade-long stop-and-
frisk program that resulted in hundreds of thousands of baseless
stops as well as racial and ethnic profiling.”131 Experts in Collins
controlled for crime rates and found “traffic and pedestrian stop
rates” to be “six times higher for Black people than for white peo-
ple.”132 The settlement inserted an independent monitor to assess
whether the Milwaukee Police Department met “certain bench-
marks”; recently, the “monitor has found progress to be slow and
uneven.”133 In 2018, Black people in Milwaukee County were 4.2
times more likely than white people to be arrested for marijuana
possession.134 District Attorney Chisholm attributes some of the
racial disparity to forces out of his control, including poverty and
educational attainment.135 But such conditions are only exacerbated
by criminal prosecution of low-level crimes, given the deleterious
consequences of incapacitating young men and saddling families
128. Id.
129. Complaint at 33, Collins v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2:17-cv-00234, (E.D. Wis. Feb. 27,
2017) [hereinafter Collins Complaint].
130. See Toobin, supra note 19.
131. Nusrat Choudhury, Stop-and-Frisk Settlement in Milwaukee Lawsuit Is a Wakeup Call
for Police Nationwide, ACLU (July 13, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-
reform/reforming-police/stop-and-frisk-settlement-milwaukee-lawsuit-wakeup-call
[https://perma.cc/R45Z-79KA]. The settlement imposed a higher level of supervision over and
accounting of police stop and frisks to ensure that “officers who conduct unlawful encounters
are counseled, retrained, or disciplined.” Id.
132. Id.
133. Ashley Luthern, The Rise and Fall of Alfonso Morales: How a Milwaukee Native
Became the City’s Top Cop, Only to Be Ousted After Two-and-Half Years, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Aug. 14, 2020, 8:55 AM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/
2020/08/14/promise-unmet-alfonso-morales-time-milwaukees-police-chief/3317693001/
[https://perma.cc/JC2N-L9JW].
134. Extreme Racial Disparities Persist in Marijuana Arrests: Wisconsin, ACLU, https://
graphics.aclu.org/marijuana-arrest-report/WI [https://perma.cc/4HTM-DZ95].
135. Toobin, supra note 19.
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with fines and fees, and then releasing those young men into the
community with a criminal history that renders poor employment
prospects worse.136
Racially disparate criminal outcomes take a village; police, pro-
secutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers have a role in
contributing to, or mitigating, these disparities.137 Police target
Black people.138 Prosecutors charge Black people more often and
more severely than similarly situated white people.139 One study
suggested that in certain counties in the United States, “judges
value freedom less for blacks than whites” and treat white defen-
dants with higher risk profiles more leniently than Black defen-
dants.140 These dynamics result in the assignment of higher risk
scores to people of color; this manufacturing of risk then justifies
harsher treatment.141
Recognizing that the criminal system is an ecosystem with each
institution contributing to or undermining efforts to decrease racial
harm, Milwaukee County established the “Race, Equity and Proce-
dural Justice Committee,” which was created to “advance racial
equity and procedural justice in Milwaukee’s criminal justice system
through collaboration.”142 Other government organizations in Mil-
waukee also adhere to the policy that multidisciplinary criminal
136. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1293-94 (2004).
137. See Tom Reed & John Chisholm, From Funnels to Large-Scale Irrigation: Changing
the Criminal Justice System Paradigm to Improve Public Health and Safety, HARV. KENNEDY
SCH. 23 (Dec. 2019), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/
pcj/files/reed_chisholm_changing_the_criminal_justice_system_paradigm.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YDF9-WY5R].
138. See, e.g., Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal Justice
System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof., WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systematic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-
justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/8UCW-E56D].
139. See, e.g., id.
140. See Shawn D. Bushway & Jonah B. Gelbach, Testing for Racial Discrimination in Bail
Setting Using Nonparametric Estimation of a Parametric Model, BERKELEY PROGRAM IN L. &
ECON. 37 (Oct. 28, 2010), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/kline/e251_s11/gelbach.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9AB-EK23].
141. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 327, 402 (2015).
142. Race, Equity, and Procedural Justice Committee, MILWAUKEE CMTY. JUST. COUNCIL,
https://www.milwaukee.gov/cjc/equity [https://perma.cc/UT94-2MKF].
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justice teams are essential to reducing racial harms.143 Milwaukee
judges, reflecting this institutional concern, have formed an ad hoc
racial justice council to address racial discrimination and to prevent
implicit racial bias.144 Thus, Milwaukee stakeholders recognize the
shared responsibility of institutional actors to work toward racial
justice.145
District Attorney Chisholm has emphasized the need to mitigate
racial disparities.146 A critical piece to Chisholm’s reasoning is the
correlation between racial disparity and public safety.147 As the
court in Collins stated, Milwaukee’s racially discriminatory prac-
tices undermine law enforcement objectives and damage “the trust
between police and the public central to achieving public safety.”148
But despite the institutional commitment to achieving racial
equality, dramatic inequality remains, and frustration over this
status quo is acute.149 The persistence of racial inequality under-
mines the criminal system’s mission-critical objective of ensuring
public safety, leading “in many ways to a ‘crisis of confidence’ in the
criminal justice system’s ability to achieve fair and equitable out-
comes.”150
But what are Milwaukee’s options to further address these con-
cerns by improving its RAI? If Milwaukee is limited to the consider-
ation of race-neutral remedies, additional options are scarce—one
race-neutral “fix” after another has not mitigated the gaping
disparities.
143. See Prosecution and Race, supra note 86.
144. Telephone Interview with Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge (Dec. 19, 2020).
145. See Prosecution and Race, supra note 86.
146. See Toobin, supra note 19.
147. See id.
148. Collins et al. v. The City of Milwaukee et al., ACLU (July 16, 2019), https://www.
aclu.org/cases/collins-et-al-v-city-milwaukee-et-al [https://perma.cc/FAX4-CH8M]. Though
Chisholm believes certain violent offenders should be incapacitated, he notes this is “a
relatively small group.” Toobin, supra note 19.
149. Telephone Interview with Paige Styler, Deputy Regional Attorney Manager,
Milwaukee Trial Division, Wisconsin State Public Defender (Jan. 12, 2021) (stating defense
attorneys are constantly communicating to each other the alarm over disparate treatment of
similarly situated defendants, but for each defendant’s race).
150. Reed & Chisholm, supra note 137, at 22.
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C. Potential Approaches to Remove Racial Bias from RAIs 
Race-neutral approaches to improve RAIs have been assiduously
deployed to mitigate the reproduction of racial harm.151 And yet,
scholars and tool designers recognize the diminishing returns of
further race-neutral approaches.152 Increased transparency, for ex-
ample, can improve data selection and accuracy.153 But knowing
what data points inform a tool does not remedy racial disparity
caused by remaining data points.154 Some propose that where data
points are proxies for race they should be eliminated, and in fact,
there has been some success in removing data points where costs of
racial harm overwhelm any predictive benefits they bring to a
tool.155 Yet, as some variables associated with racial discrimination
“are struck from assessment tools, the predictive power of these
instruments wanes.”156 Recognizing the lack of race-neutral options,
some scholars have considered race-informed adjustments to
RAIs.157
151. See Eaglin, supra note 36, at 214-17.
152. See id. at 216-18.
153. Not only can the selection of data be scrutinized, but also its completeness. Samuel
R. Wiseman, The Criminal Justice Black Box, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 359 (2017) (advocating
reliance on more comprehensive data sets that reduce fragmentation).
154. See Starr, supra note 29, at 806. Former Attorney General Eric Holder warned that
RAIs based on education level, socioeconomic background, or neighborhood could exacerbate
criminal system disparities. Devlin Barrett, Holder Cautions on Risk of Bias in Big Data Use
in Criminal Justice, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
attorney-general-cautions-on-risk-of-bias-in-big-data-use-in-criminal-justice-1406916606
[https://perma.cc/TNE4-E9GJ].
155. See O’NEIL, supra note 62, at 210 (“Are we going to sacrifice the accuracy of the model
for fairness?... In some cases, yes. If we’re going to be equal before the law, or be treated
equally as voters, we cannot stand for systems that drop us into different castes and treat us
differently.”).
156. Oleson, supra note 29, at 1337 & n.42 (“[O]mitting factors that are correlated with
race from a model to predict recidivism reduced the accuracy of the model by five to twelve
percentage points.” (citing Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based Justice:
Prediction and Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 174 (1987))).
157. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 1, at 1129; Hellman supra note 7, at 819; Mayson, supra
note 7, at 2268-69. It should be mentioned that some consider race-informed approaches in
order to increase transparency, as opposed to mitigating racial disparity. See Crystal S. Yang,
Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1466-71 (2017) (using race as a
variable with predictive value so as to make transparent the role of race in algorithmic
calculations).
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A race-informed remedy will have different objectives: to ensure
white and Black people are forecast to have similar risk rates
(statistical parity);158 to ensure the same proportion of white and
Black people are wrongfully forecast for re-arrest (false-positive
parity);159 or to ensure the same proportion of white and Black
people are arrested who were not forecasted to be re-arrested (false-
negative parity).160 Professor Sandra Mayson, for example, proposed
using a tool’s false-positive disparity as a diagnostic to assess where
a community should direct additional resources to disadvantaged
communities.161
Professor Aziz Huq’s race-informed approach addresses the sta-
tistical disparity between the risk scores of racial groups.162 Huq
asserts that “our policing and adjudicative institutions play signifi-
cant roles in the reproduction and entrenchment of social stratifica-
tion,” particularly when it comes to the distribution of low-level,
nonviolent crimes.163 Huq opined that “it will sometimes be neces-
sary to use race to achieve substantively accurate policy results.”164
As to a race-informed remedy, Huq expressed concern that an
under-correction would result in racial “stratification effects” due to
“asymmetrical spillovers from criminal justice for minority but not
majority populations.”165 But Huq also worried about an over-
correction that releases high-risk individuals into a community.166
Huq concluded any race-based adjustment should allocate state
coercion so that the spillover costs of that coercion on a minority
group do not outweigh the benefits afforded by the algorithm to that
group.167 Huq’s remedy would adjust the thresholds for assessing
low, medium, and high-risk groups by race.168 Thresholds would
158. See Huq, supra note 1, at 1115-16.
159. Hellman, supra note 7, at 819; Mayson, supra note 7, at 2243-44.
160. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2244.
161. See id. at 2268-70.
162. See Huq, supra note 1, at 1102.
163. Id. at 1103.
164. Id. at 1102. Huq acknowledges an “irreconcilable tension ... between having equally
accurate predictions of high risk and equalizing the rates of false positives within the pool of
nonrecidivist suspects.” Id. at 1055.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1046-47.
167. Id. at 1111, 1113 (“If an algorithmic tool generates public security by imposing greater
costs (net of benefits) for blacks as a group, it raises a racial equity concern.”).
168. See id. at 1129-31.
246 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:219
depend on “the immediate costs of coercion ... balanced by its
benefits” to any community.169 Huq predicts that the threshold for
Black persons would be moved farther out (be more forgiving) than
for white persons in the assessment of low-risk individuals, but that
any racially informed adjustment between high-risk thresholds
would be relatively small.170 Huq left it to a future project to as-
certain how one might identify the point in which racially asymmet-
rical coercion becomes unjustified.171
Irrespective of approach, scholars considering a race-informed
remedy recognize the shadow of strict scrutiny.172 Huq thought a
race-based remedy would face significant constitutional
resistance.173 Mayson predicts constitutional foreclosure of a race-
conscious approach.174 Professor Deborah Hellman contends race-
based adjustments to the same tool face an insurmountable
constitutional terrain.175 In contrast to these assessments, this
169. Id. at 1129, 1131 (“Accordingly, the point on the x-axis at which costs are equal to
benefits for the minority is to the right of the same break-even point for the majority group.”).
170. Id. at 1056-57 (stating more work needs to be done to properly assess downstream
coercion costs to making algorithmic adjustments). As to such racial disparities, Huq refer-
enced Professor Randall Kennedy’s “racial tax” and argued that “there is no a priori reason
why state coercion should be equally distributed among racial groups.” Id. at 1120, 1131.
171. Id. at 1131-33.
172. See id. at 1133; Mayson, supra note 7, at 2240 & n.66; Hellman, supra note 7, at 852-
53. But see Hamilton, supra note 32, at 259 (“[I]f racial and ethnic variables significantly
improved the predictive validity of risk-needs models, then including them would appear to
be narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interests.”). What about using equal
protection to challenge racial disparities generated by RAI? This may be viable where an RAI
explicitly uses race. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1987) (inferring
intentional discrimination where agency never hired a Black trooper); Clark v. Thompson, 313
F.2d 637, 638 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (finding town’s segregation intentional and un-
constitutional). But risk tools typically rely on race-neutral data and developers recite a
commitment to racial fairness; thus, a challenge would typically be limited to a disparate
impact theory. Washington v. Davis likely shields race-neutral tools from challenge regardless
of disparate effects. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). In the criminal context, McCleskey v. Kemp
arrives at the same destination. 481 U.S. 279, 293-95, 352-53 (1987). But see Brenner et al.,
supra note 48, at 296-97 (providing alternative theories to challenge racial disparities in RAIs,
for example, under a theory that “continued use” of such tools constitutes the requisite intent
to violate equal protection).
173. Huq, supra note 1, at 1133.
174. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2240 & n.66.
175. Hellman, supra note 7, at 852-53 (concluding “different thresholds for the target trait
for each racial group” is “legally prohibited”). Professor Hellman, however, proposes that
known racial disparities can inform an algorithm’s design as to different racial groups; under
this approach, white defendants and Black defendants would be subject to different tools that
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Article contends a race-based remedy potentially satisfies strict
scrutiny review. This analysis requires vetting a proposed race-
based remedy, and so the Article proposes one: the Racial Disparity
Cap. This Article then subjects the remedy to traditional doctrinal
treatment.
D. A Proposed Remedy: The Racial Disparity Cap
The Racial Disparity Cap (RDC) seeks to achieve racial parity in
the use of risk assessment tools. A jurisdiction would first take
measure of any racial disparities unique to the jurisdiction. To do so,
a jurisdiction would calculate the average risk scores of different
racial groups over a period of time.176 The average risk score of the
white population would presumably serve as the baseline. If the
average risk score of Black defendants, for example, exceeds this
baseline, the differential captures some portion of racial harm and
discrimination visited on Black defendants in that jurisdiction.
When a Black defendant is then assigned a preliminary score, the
disparity differential is subtracted out before the tool assigns a low,
medium, or high-risk designation. In sum, the RDC assesses the
mean risk score of racial groups; any assessed disparities are sub-
sequently applied to the scores of individual members of burdened
racial groups.177
Assume the mean score for the tool used in a county was five for
white defendants, six for Latino defendants, and seven for Black
defendants. This would mean, compared to the white population,
the average raw score of Latino defendants was 20 percent higher,
and for Black defendants 40 percent higher, than average white
nevertheless rely on race-neutral data points. Id. Under this approach, a designer chooses a
set of race-neutral data points that best mitigate racial discriminatory results for that racial
group. This means that, as to a white defendant and a Black defendant, the data points that
are used to generate a risk score would differ.
176. Eaglin, supra note 17, at 85 (“The algorithm produces an instantaneous quantitative
outcome based on the information selected from the predictive model.... Most risk tools
translate that quantitative outcome into a qualitative ‘risk score.’”).
177. Hellman described two ways to achieve racial parity: (1) “segment the data to create
two different predictive algorithms” (for example, one for Black defendants, one for white
defendants), or (2) “use [race] within the algorithm.” Hellman, supra note 7, at 849. The RDC
is a third approach: it applies a separately generated race-based adjustment to an individual’s
raw score.
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scores. The disparity differential for Latino defendants (+1) and for
Black defendants (+2) would be used to adjust raw scores for in-
dividual defendants. Scores of white defendants would remain
unchanged since the average for the white population serves as the
baseline. A white defendant with a raw score of 7.3 would remain so
(7.3-0=7.3). For a Latino defendant, however, a raw score of 7.3
would be adjusted to 6.3 (7.3-1=6.3). A Black defendant’s raw score
of 7.3 would be adjusted to 5.3 (7.3-2=5.3).
Because jurisdictions use different tools, and because racial
harms vary by jurisdiction,178 the calculation of the disparity dif-
ferential would vary. For example, in Milwaukee County, Black
residents are 3.2 times more likely to be arrested than white
residents for marijuana possession, but immediately north in
Ozaukee County, Black residents are 34.9 times more likely to be
arrested than white residents for possession.179 One would expect
the disparity differential in Milwaukee to be less than in Ozaukee.
Some scholars see a tension between predictive accuracy and
achieving statistical parity across races.180 But the validity of pre-
dictive accuracy depends on what one wants to measure. Tools are
intended to predict the likelihood that an individual will recid-
ivate.181 But what if the tool is not predicting the chance a person
engages in unlawful conduct, but instead is predicting a person’s
chance of being caught in a racially discriminatory regime?182
Acknowledging these troubling conditions, some still worry that
178. For instance, in Milwaukee County, the Black population (39 percent) comprises 70
percent of the arrest rate, and nearby Glendale’s Black population (14 percent) comprises 78
percent of the arrest rate. Chloe Frankovic, Racial Disparities in Arrest Rates in Milwaukee
County, U. WIS.-MADISON CARTOGRAPHY LAB’Y, https://geography.wisc.edu/cartography/
project/G370/2019SP/Spring2019_FrankovicChloe.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GJM-T2YJ].
179. Corrinne Hess, Report: Black Wisconsinites 4.3 Times More Likely to Be Convicted for
Possession of Marijuana, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 22, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/
report-black-wisconsinites-4-3-times-more-likely-be-convicted-possession-marijuana
[https://perma.cc/DYC6-NPJZ].
180. See Mayson, supra note 7, at 2228-33; Huq, supra note 1, at 1124-25.
181. Eaglin, supra note 17, at 61-62.
182. See Eaglin, supra note 36, at 215-16; Michael M. O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts:
Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 471 (2009)
(“[M]ore serious criminal records of black drug defendants are at least in part a byproduct of
law enforcement policies and practices that systematically result in higher arrest risks for
black drug offenders than white.”); Capers, supra note 66, at 67; Carbado, supra note 66, at
1485.
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“unless we know actual offending rates (which we generally do not),
reconfiguring the data or algorithm to reflect a statistical scenario
we prefer merely distorts the predictive mirror, so that it reflects
neither the data nor any demonstrable reality.”183 But the applica-
tion of the RDC arguably reflects both the data and the demonstra-
ble reality; it uses standardized data to measure racial disparities
that emerge from racially oppressive conditions, which in turn
reflect demonstrable realities for different racial groups.184 As
Mayson observed, a tool’s measurement of racial disparity “puts the
dragon of predictive inequality out on the plain. It is frightful, but
at least we can see it.”185 With the application of the RDC, a portion
of a person’s reality attributed to racism is accounted for, and we ap-
proach a clearer picture of someone’s actual risk profile within a
legitimate criminal system.186
What assumptions are at play with the RDC approach? (1) Any
significant racial disparity between white persons and persons of
color is explained by racial discrimination; for example, if a lower
socioeconomic condition correlates with race, it is either because a
racial group is biologically wired to underperform (this is obviously
false) or, due to discrimination, a racial group has been impeded
from obtaining power, status, and wealth (the RDC credits this
view).187 (2) Racial discrimination is perpetrated by policing, pro-
secution, public defending, and adjudication, as Black people are
detained by police more often, arrested at higher rates, given decli-
nations at lower rates, subject to more severe charging decisions,
subject to higher pretrial detention rates, more vulnerable to jury
prejudice, and given more severe sentences.188 (3) The state’s
183. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2225.
184. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM.&MARYL.REV. 857,
863-64 (2017) (contending that racially disparate results of assessment tools reflect demon-
strable realities created by racial discrimination).
185. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2281.
186. See Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2017)
(observing algorithmic approaches in criminal justice are inevitably “deeply suffused with
invidious discrimination”); Mayson, supra note 7, at 2264 (“A colorblind algorithm ... inflates
the black man’s risk score and deflates the white man’s relative to their true values.”).
187. See Angela Hanks, Danyelle Solomon & Christian E. Weller, Systematic Inequality,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/EE7B-NE2T].
188. See Webb, supra note 1, at 129-30 n.14; Berdejó, supra note 1, at 1189; Balko, supra
note 138.
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overuse of police discretion, surveillance, and force in communities
of color causes significant harm by breaking up families through
incarceration and imposing collateral consequences that erode
economic security and political engagement.189 (4) A criminal system
that continues to reproduce these racial harms will never be viewed
as fair or legitimate by the very communities in need of protec-
tion.190 (5) In the absence of public confidence, the criminal system
cannot ensure public safety and health.191 (6) Race-based environ-
mental risks should be excluded from one’s risk profile, as they rep-
resent a “‘co-constituted social and ecological context,’ which shapes
‘health, disease, and well-being within and across historical genera-
tions.’”192 As Professor Sara Jacoby found in her empirical study of
Philadelphia:
When we look at the 1937 [Redlining] Map in relationship to
contemporary violence and firearm assaults, we find that the
same places that were imagined to be areas unworthy of eco-
nomic investment by virtue of the races, ethnicities, and
religions of their residents are more likely to be the places where
violence and violent injury are most common almost a century
later.193
(7) Harms perpetrated by state-mandated discrimination and vio-
lence should not be compounded by increased state coercion, which
itself constitutes racial discrimination.194
189. See Roberts, supra note 136, at 1272-73; Gabriel J. Chin, Review, Felon Disen-
franchisement and Democracy in the Late Jim Crow Era, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 330
(2007) (noting as to employment, a felony conviction results in a life of “limited employment
prospects” and, as to the right to vote, some states (Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia) disen-
franchise “persons with felony records for life”).
190. See Balko, supra note 138.
191. See id.
192. Sara F. Jacoby, Beidi Dong, Jessica H. Beard, Douglas J. Wiebe & Christopher N.
Morrison, The Enduring Impact of Historical and Structural Racism on Urban Violence in
Philadelphia, 199 SOC. SCI. & MED. 87, 87 (2018) (quoting Nancy Krieger, Living and Dying
at the Crossroads: Racism, Embodiment, and Why Theory is Essential for a Public Health of
Consequence, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 832, 832 (2016)).
193. Id. at 92.
194. This state-mandated harm, absent governmental investment to counter the negative
consequences, is ongoing: “Representations of urban space like the [Redlining] Maps have
social meaning and create cascading feedback loops by encouraging people to move out of
degraded areas whenever possible, leading to further stigmatization.” Id. at 93.
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The RDC approach breaks rank with Huq’s theory that a racially
asymmetrical deployment of state coercion can be legitimate.195 The
RDC approach would, under Mayson’s view, distort “the statistical
mirror to ignore [racial] difference [which] will just produce dis-
parate rates of error, which might increase the net burden on the
very communities the intervention was intended to protect.”196
Under these views, the RDC threatens to release defendants of color
into the community who are prone to violent recidivism, undermin-
ing public safety.
Some responses. First, application of the RDC—which would
reduce the risk assessment of some persons of color—brings the
assessment closer to one’s risk of recidivism, versus one’s risk of
getting caught.197 Second, Huq’s theory conflates a person’s actual
risk profile with the state’s manufacture of a person of color’s risk
assessment by increasing the number and severity of charges im-
posed due to the person’s race.198 Third, Huq’s assumption that some
incremental increase in state coercion asymmetrically applied to a
community of color will improve public safety is far from a received
truth.199 Where Huq credits the notion that asymmetrically deployed
state power based on race may be justified,200 the RDC approach
assumes any racially asymmetrical distribution of state coercion
exacerbates existing structural harms. In application, the RDC
provides limited mitigation of the harms of an ever-present exertion
of an increased level of state coercion in communities of color.
Huq’s discussion of risk and its relationship to state coercion illu-
minates an additional issue.201 If we reduced the police force by 80
percent, people would be caught less, and, as a result, risk scores
195. See Huq, supra note 1, at 1131. Huq contends increased state intervention is
legitimate to the extent that it is not exceeded by negative externalities caused by disparate
treatment—a cost-benefit “break-even point.” Id. This Article contends that disparities in the
application of state coercion, in which the marginalized group carries the increased burden,
should not be permitted.
196. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2272.
197. See Zhang et al., supra note 47, at 184.
198. See Huq, supra note 1, at 1054-57.
199. See id. at 1131.
200. Id. Disagreement over what sort of criminal intervention is congruent with public
safety is fierce, and studies are subject to widely different interpretations; for example, did
the crime rate go down because of zero-tolerance policing or because the economy improved?
201. Id.
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would decline (irrespective of whether less, more, or the same num-
ber of people engaged in unlawful conduct). Whether a person’s
unlawful conduct is detected or acknowledged occurs within the
state’s purview.202 The RDC assumes that the state’s deployment of
coercion applied to white people produces the most “reasonable”
assessment of risk, given that a more politically responsive level of
state coercion occurs in white spaces. The RDC attempts to correct
for the increased coercion that occurs outside white spaces, and for
less merciful conditions that occur in the absence of being white. In
this way, the RDC is a limited intervention, as it does not attempt
to account for other conditions society might not want to contribute
to a risk assessment. For example, the distortion to risk assess-
ments caused by class disparities is not directly attended to by the
RDC. Even as to racial harm, the RDC is limited in its remediation.
For example, the RDC does nothing to prevent a person of color from
being arrested because of targeted surveillance; it does not attend
to the harm related to that arrest and the initial detention, and oth-
er than providing a downward adjustment to correct for racial
disparity at a particular intersect point, it does not mitigate racial
disparities that emerge in the individual’s subsequent interactions
with criminal system actors.
Some scholars warn of unintended consequences in using a race-
informed remedy to mitigate an RAI’s racial harm.203 Professors Bo
Cowgill and Megan Stevenson, for example, consider the conse-
quences of a tool’s developer inputting preferences into the algo-
rithm as a form of social engineering.204 This becomes particularly
problematic in the absence of algorithmic transparency, where the
designer “chooses to obfuscate because she does not approve of what
the judge will do with this information.”205 A possible consequence—
when the judge uses the tool and becomes aware of the developer’s
preferences, she will “place less weight on the algorithmic scores.”206
In addition to undermining the tool’s accuracy, this dynamic can
subvert the designer’s intentions, however laudatory.207 For
202. See Zhang et al., supra note 47, at 184.
203. See, e.g., Cowgill & Stevenson, supra note 44, at 96, 99-100.
204. Id. at 96, 98.
205. Id. at 98.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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example, as to an algorithmic feature designed to improve racial
parity, a resistant judge may compensate in a way that actually
increases racial disparities.208 A better approach, it is argued, may
be to target the judge’s preferences.209
Some responses. First, the tool’s algorithmic processing of data
and the RDC’s adjustment remain separate functions, and even if
there is no algorithmic transparency (there should be), the disparity
differential is transparent. The disparity differentials in the juris-
diction are known, reducing suspicion that could exaggerate the size
and impact of any judicial adjustment. Second, as to concerns over
decision maker resistance to a modified score, one can track judicial
decision-making; judges who significantly fall outside the bell curve
of a judge’s expected deviation from the RAI’s recommendation could
be counseled on use of the tool. As Professor Vincent Southerland
observed, these tools can “flip the gaze,” and decision-making pat-
terns of particular stakeholders—like judges—can be scored and
appropriately evaluated.210 Decision maker bias that undermines
the application of the RDC would be accounted for when the juris-
diction periodically recalculates the racial disparity differentials in
the jurisdiction (which serves as a report card for efforts to achieve
racial parity within use of the tool).
A few more observations. The RDC ignores differences between
algorithms. Although transparency of data lends integrity to the
process, even if the nature of a vendor’s data points are unknown,
any algorithm always reduces risk to a number. Thus, the RDC can
be applied even where proprietary interests prevail in cloaking the
tool’s innards. The RDC’s indifference to transparency becomes even
more important as machine learning approaches predominate; algo-
rithmic behavior will only become more opaque as artificial
intelligence will “sift through vast numbers of variables, looking for
combinations that reliably predict outcomes” and “combin[e] them
in nonlinear and highly interactive ways.”211 As Huq notes, errors
that emerge in the machine learning context can be hard to
208. See id.
209. Id. at 99.
210. Vincent M. Southerland, The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the
Criminal Legal System, 80 MD. L. REV. 487, 547-49 (2021).
211. Ziad Obermeyer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Predicting the Future—Big Data, Machine
Learning, and Clinical Medicine, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1216, 1217 (2016). 
254 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:219
diagnose and accordingly, can be “durable.”212 And yet, the RDC is
indifferent to the methodology employed. The RDC does not
interfere with jurisdictional efforts to undermine or improve the
tool’s integrity—the RDC will measure the racial disparities unique
to a jurisdiction generated by local practices, the type of RAI used,
and the underlying process in reaching final decisions.
A final observation. As Professor Sonja Starr observed, implemen-
tation of RAIs may not change outcomes at all, but only serve to
provide false legitimacy.213 But there is inherent value in the use of
RAIs; they have engendered discussions over criminal system
decision-making, increased opportunities to measure and address
disparities, and provided some resistance to arbitrary swings that
unbridled discretion generates.214 The RDC helps an RAI achieve
these goals.
Should a jurisdiction consider implementing the RDC, it is likely
a white defendant would bring a lawsuit alleging he should be given
the same calculation the jurisdiction afforded to a Black defendant.
Before engaging in an equal protection analysis, a preliminary ques-
tion would be the plaintiff’s standing: could he show he was actually
injured? The white defendant might argue, for example, that if he
received the same adjustment given to a Black defendant in the
jurisdiction, he would have been released. According to this reason-
ing, solely because of the white defendant’s race, he was denied a
benefit accorded to members in a different racial group. This
opportunity-centric standing analysis arguably tracks the Court’s
analysis in Bakke;215 as a petitioner in an affirmative action case is
212. Huq, supra note 1, at 1067.
213. See Starr, supra note 29, at 851-52 (reviewing studies that indicate an insignificant
deviation in outcomes, whether or not the RAI is employed); see also Julia Dressel & Hany
Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 17,
2018, at 1, 1.
214. See About the Public Safety Assessment: What Is the PSA?, supra note 121.
215. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1465-66 (1988) (“The device of recharacterization of the injury may seem artificial,
but it is at work in at least one Supreme Court decision.... There was no showing that Bakke
would have been admitted to the medical program of the University of California at Davis if
the affirmative action program were invalidated. The Court responded that ‘even if Bakke had
been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special program,
it would not follow that he lacked standing .... The trial court found such an injury, apart from
failure to be admitted, in the University’s decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100
places in the class, simply because of his race.’” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
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considered injured by the loss of opportunity to earn a benefit
(admission to a university), a white defendant is injured by the loss
of opportunity to earn a benefit (pretrial release).216 Here, the injury
is arguably more concrete: it is conceivable a white defendant could
show that, in fact, application of the RDC to his or her case would
have resulted in a different outcome. Conversely, the standing argu-
ment is also arguably weaker: Bakke did not argue for a similar
race-based benefit (for example, a set number of spots in the
admission process being reserved for white applicants), but rather
argued that in the absence of the race-based remedy his chances of
admission were better.217 Here, however, a white defendant could
not argue that in the absence of applying the RDC a different out-
come for the white defendant was possible. Still, assuming that a
plaintiff’s arguments might find the receptive ears of at least one
judge, the next question emerges: what standard of review applies?
This Article does not take a position on the appropriate standard
of review. It would be reasonable for a jurisdiction to argue that to
stop discrimination against people of color, it must adjust the RAI’s
algorithm, and that an action to stop active discrimination does not
require a showing of strict scrutiny, especially where the remedy
places no burden on members of any racial group. However per-
suasive this approach may be, this Article assumes a worst-case
scenario for the sake of argument. Should a court impose strict
scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of the RDC, this Article is
intended to aid the jurisdiction in satisfying the standard, however
unjustified the imposition of strict scrutiny may be.218
U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978))). 
216. Even if this is not wholly convincing, the flimsiness of standing doctrine is readily
acknowledged. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 447, 452-63 (2020). Moreover, a defendant could also allege a stigmatic injury,
that a jurisdiction’s use of the RDC stigmatizes white defendants by leading those defendants
to receive less favorable pretrial and sentencing outcomes. See generally Thomas Healy,
Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2007). Given the mathematic precision
of the RDC, this defendant could likely allege such an injury with the particularity absent
from the stigmatic injury alleged in Allen v. Wright. See 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984).
217. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14.
218. The moment strict scrutiny comes into play is far from clear, despite sweeping state-
ments in cases like Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. See 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“All
racial classifications, imposed by [the government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.”). Yet, one would expect that a police department engaging in a practice
of racial profiling need not satisfy strict scrutiny before ending the practice. The remedial line
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II. RACE-BASED REMEDIES, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW
Although strict scrutiny presents significant obstacles for affir-
mative race-based remedies in higher education and employment
spheres,219 in the context of criminal law, equal protection chal-
lenges to race-based interventions have been largely unsuccessful.220
The RDC is well-situated within the protective awning courts ex-
tend to criminal system actors to achieve public safety objectives,
regardless of the level of scrutiny applied.
To survive strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate its
race-based intervention is narrowly tailored to address a compelling
state interest.221 The anticlassification interpretation of this stan-
dard makes no distinction between benign and malignant intent to
discriminate.222 Justice Roberts summarized the philosophy in
Parents Involved: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”223 The anti-
classification principle has roots in tempering white apprehension
over equal protection’s potential to disrupt the status quo. For
example, in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, which reassured white
people of their right to discriminate against Black people free from
in which strict scrutiny applies is unclear and contested.
219. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003); Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v.
Young, 608 F.2d 671, 697-98 (6th Cir. 1979).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding a
racially significant sentencing regime between crack and powder cocaine). But see Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87, 93-94 (1986) (holding a person’s race “is unrelated to his fitness
as a juror” and cannot be taken into consideration during voir dire (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
221. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227
(noting “all racial classifications” are subject to strict scrutiny and “are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests”); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 299.
222. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. 476 U.S. 267, 310-11 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
223. 551 U.S. at 748. A similar sentiment can be found in Plessy v. Ferguson: “Legislation
is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the
present situation.” 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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federal interference, the Court construed government protection
from racial harm as favoritism to Black persons:
When a man has emerged from slavery ... there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of
a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws,
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.224
Accommodating white attachment to principles of neutrality, the
Court has often employed the anticlassification principle to consti-
tutionally prohibit race-based remedies.225 The colorblind view
deems racial discrimination abhorrent as it impedes any path to
accountability for racial harms.226 Worse, the colorblind approach
protects the dividends of racism from criticism by facilitating an
identity formation that permits white beneficiaries of racism to
nevertheless see themselves as victims of racism.227
In contrast, the antisubordination interpretation is more defer-
ential to government attempts to identify interests that can be
solved with race-based remedies.228 Proponents believe it possible to
differentiate between government efforts to account for racial harm
and efforts to maintain racial oppression, like Jim Crow and red-
lining conditions.229 The Equal Protection Clause is viewed as a
response to “legacies of racial subordination” and a corrective to
“advantages gained through intergenerational white privilege.”230
224. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
225. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
226. See id. (“Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” (quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943))).
227. Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale
on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 431-32 (2014).
228. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 529, 551-53 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the city’s determination showing “that minority-owned
businesses have received virtually no city contracting dollars” to constitute a compelling
interest and stating that strict scrutiny should not apply to race-conscious remedial
measures).
229. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 5-7 (2019).
230. Mario L. Barnes, We Will Turn Back?: On Why Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke Makes the Case for Adopting More Radically Race-Conscious Admissions Policies,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2265, 2277 (2019); accord Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The
American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV.
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The Constitution, which for centuries permitted “ingenious and
pervasive forms of discrimination” against people of color, should
not “stand[ ] as a barrier” to attempts to remedy “that legacy of
discrimination.”231 The antisubordination approach would embrace
a more deferential form of judicial scrutiny, like intermediate
scrutiny.232
The antisubordination view finds no traction in the doctrine. But
an orthodox anticlassification view fails to explain the doctrine as
well. Rather, a denomination of the anticlassification view, the con-
textual approach, accommodates current doctrine. First articulated
by Justice O’Connor, this approach is highly skeptical of race-based
remedies, but permits reluctant deference in the presence of certain
contextual factors.233 In explaining the departure from unyielding
resistance,234 she stated, “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-
based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”235
9, 30-31 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1540 (2004).
231. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall, J., con-
curring).
232. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1335 n.162 (2011); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1036
(1986) (noting four Justices in Bakke “found it necessary to apply intermediate scrutiny to
race-based affirmative action policies in order to justify validation of those policies”). 
233. Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49
HOW. L.J. 241, 248-49 (2006) (charting Justice O’Connor’s “evolving” jurisprudence, from
“Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Shaw v. Reno, Adarand, Grutter, and Johnson v. California”
(footnotes omitted)); Linda S. Greene, The Constitution and Racial Equality After Gratz and
Grutter, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 253, 274 (2004) (“Though Justice O’Connor did offer obeisance to
strict scrutiny, her joinder of strict scrutiny with ‘context’ and ‘deference’ weakens the
standard and signals a retreat from the ‘skepticism’ about all racial classifications that
marked her Metro dissent and her Adarand opinion.” (footnote omitted)).
234. Justice O’Connor’s journey took her from Croson, where she rejected a city’s race-
based remedy, to Grutter fifteen years later, where she deferred to a university’s announced
need for race-based admission policies. Compare City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 476-81, 511 (1989) (determining that a plan requiring businesses awarded city
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the value of their contract to
minority-owned businesses violated equal protection), and id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(commenting how O’Connor was so intent on “second-guessing Richmond’s judgment” as to
the existence of past discrimination), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315, 318, 328
(2003) (upholding admissions policy’s “flexible assessment” that considered undergraduate
GPA and test scores, but also “‘soft’ variables,” including how an applicant might help the
school reach a “critical mass of underrepresented minority students”).
235. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
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In an almost confessional tone, she observed: “[j]ust as growing up
in a particular region or having particular professional experiences
is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters.”236 Dissenting justices
thought her shift was a break with anticlassification orthodoxy.237
It was.
Justice O’Connor’s contextual approach helps draw a thread
through an otherwise disjointed doctrine. Before and after her artic-
ulation of equal protection doctrine, courts have recognized the
importance of context. As Judge Posner observed, a plaintiff cannot
merely cite to and rely on decisional language that seems to pre-
clude the constitutionality of a race-based remedy; rather, “the
weight of [prior] judicial language depends on context.”238 The Court
in Johnson v. California similarly stated, “Prisons are dangerous
places, and the special circumstances they present may justify racial
classifications in some contexts.”239 A contextual approach was em-
ployed in Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II), where Justice
Kennedy focused analysis on particular challenges that face a
university and the interests in diversity that are unique to the edu-
cational mission.240 In his dissent, Justice Alito further anchored the
conceptual shift, stating, “Racial discrimination [is] invidious in all
contexts,” and that “in ‘all contexts,’ racial classifications are per-
mitted only ‘as a last resort.’”241 The majority disagreed.242
Within contextual features unique to the criminal system, this
Article attempts to provide guidance to criminal system stake-
holders that are considering race-based responses to racial harms.
Recognizing the different interpretive approaches one can take, and
the ideological lifting each does, this Article attempts to situate the
236. Id. at 333.
237. Id. at 379-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
238. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863
F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1981);
Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1979); Minnick v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., 157 Cal. Rptr. 260, 268-69 (Ct. App. 1979)).
239. 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).
240. 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
241. Id. at 2221 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991)).
242. See id. at 2214-15.
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constitutional analysis within existing doctrinal constraints: a
contextual, anticlassification approach to determining whether a
race-based intervention is narrowly tailored and supported by a
compelling governmental interest.
A. Compelling Interest
What constitutes a compelling interest under existing doctrine is
contested; there is debate over whether a broad range of interests
are potentially in play,243 such as ensuring diversity in employment
and education,244 fighting societal discrimination,245 carrying out an
institution’s mission or objective,246 and addressing an institution’s
past acts of racial discrimination.247 Not all interests carry equal
243. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLAL.REV. 1267, 1321-22 (2007)
(stating “the Supreme Court has frequently adopted an astonishingly casual approach to
identifying compelling interests,” and noting that the Court will accept “interests as com-
pelling on the basis of little or no textual inquiry”); see, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (recognizing that the list of compelling
interests is not static, stating, “Without attempting ... to set forth all the interests a school
district might assert, it suffices to note that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial
classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling”
(emphasis added)).
244. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1980) (ensuring racial diversity in
federal workplace); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211-12 (1995) (ensuring
socioeconomic diversity of federal contractors); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 486 (1989) (attempting to remedy past discrimination in the construction industry);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (1978) (finding racial diversity in
higher education a compelling interest); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 278 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting diversity includes geographical, racial, linguistic, and
socioeconomic diversity in higher education); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (noting
the same factors as in Gratz).
245. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (“Societal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.” (emphasis
added)).
246. As to carrying out an agency’s mission, see, for example, Talbert v. City of Richmond,
648 F.2d 925, 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005) (“Pris-
ons are dangerous places, and the special circumstances they present may justify racial
classifications in some contexts.”). As to carrying out objectives, see, for example, Barhold v.
Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating law enforcement must appear to be
unbiased to “carry out its mission effectively”); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding inmates’ perceptions of operational fairness to be a compelling need).
247. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166, 167 (1987) (stating that “[t]he Court is
in agreement that ... remedying past or present racial discrimination ... is a sufficiently
weighty state interest to warrant” a race-based remedy, and “[t]he Government unques-
tionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by a state
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weight, but depending on the circumstances, they may all qualify as
compelling.248
From the Court’s perspective, even if an interest may be compel-
ling in the abstract, particular circumstances may render it insuf-
ficient. In Parents Involved, for example, the Court recognized the
importance of addressing the effects of past discrimination in the
abstract, but noted the absence of any showing by the school district
that it had actually engaged in such acts.249 It is thus incumbent on
the institutional actor to demonstrate why a stated interest is in
fact compelling.
In making that showing, contextual circumstances that can find
judicial receptivity include: a clearly articulated institutional inter-
est,250 a close fit between the interest and the institution’s core
objectives,251 expert opinion supporting the institution’s interest,252
actor” (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O’Connor, J., concurring))); Parents Involved, 551
U.S. at 720 (acknowledging interest in addressing past discrimination to be potentially
compelling).
248. Courts have hotly debated the importance of diversity in education, but more easily
accept the importance of criminal system actors to ensure public safety. Grutter, 539 U.S. at
356-57 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that diversity in higher
education is not a compelling interest, given that the justification is nothing more than a call
for “marginal improvements in legal education”); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In
Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.”, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147,
147-48 (1979) (stating that under the diversity justification, we want students in medical
school, for example, to “work and play with pianists, maybe flute players ... people from the
country, from the city ... bespectacled chess champions and football players. And, oh yes, we
may want some racial minorities, too. If that is all it takes to overcome the presumption
against discrimination by race, we have witnessed an historic trivialization of the Consti-
tution”).
249. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720-21 (noting neither district could assert “the com-
pelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination” because Seattle
had no evidence that it had engaged in this discrimination and because Jefferson County had
“achieved unitary status”).
250. See id.
251. See Eboni S. Nelson, In Defense of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational
Autonomy and Expert Judgments in Fisher v. Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133, 1148 (2013)
(noting “the recognition of educational autonomy in higher education, and ... the complexity
of academic judgments involved in making such decisions” as influential to granting deference
to the need for a diverse student body); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
313 (1978).
252. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996) (demonstrating judicial
deference to the opinions of subject matter experts); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-31 (acknowl-
edging the persuasiveness of amici briefs of experts supporting institutional assessments of
need). 
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supplemental constitutional concerns that amplify an institution’s
stated interest,253 and the institution’s current or past acts.254 These
circumstances are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.255 A
jurisdiction’s persuasive framing of a compelling interest within
these circumstances may convince a court that a proposed race-
based remedy is “motivated by a truly powerful and worthy
concern.”256 The following analysis considers these potential circum-
stances within the criminal system.
1. What Is the Compelling Interest of the Criminal 
System That Is at Play, and What Is the Basis for That
Interest?
An institution must first articulate what the compelling interest
is. What is it here? That existing racial disparities undermine the
criminal system’s ability to achieve its core public safety objectives.
Stakeholders concede that in the absence of public confidence and
community perceptions of fairness, the criminal justice system can-
not operate effectively to ensure public safety.257 In framing a
compelling interest, courts will often refer to the “operational
need[s]” of the criminal system.258 “[O]perational need[s]” are those
conditions identified by an institution that are essential to accom-
plishing criminal system objectives within a community served.259
A universally recognized operational need is the maintenance of
253. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (acknowledging the supplemental weight of First
Amendment concerns that support the institution’s stated interest).
254. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1987).
255. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720-21 (holding that the school system failed
to show racial imbalance was traceable to segregation); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (stating that the school system failed to show that societal discrimination
was compelling by itself without a further showing of past discrimination and that the
asserted importance of role models for children was not sufficient).
256. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 918.
257. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, SHADOW VIGILANTES: HOW DISTRUST
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM BREEDS A NEW KIND OF LAWLESSNESS 13-14 (2018) (discussing how
“ordinary people sometimes believe they have reason to doubt the criminal justice system’s
devotion to doing justice” which “undermine[s] the criminal justice system’s ability to harness
the powerful forces of social influence and internalized norms”).
258. See Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating, as to the employ-
ment policy within a parole office, two possible justifications for a race-based policy, “a history
of past discrimination” or “operational need”).
259. Id. at 238.
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public confidence and community perceptions of fairness given that
criminal system interventions involve coercion and system actors
are afforded broad discretion to investigate,260 detain,261 prosecute,262
and incarcerate.263 Stakeholders recognize that coercion alone is ins-
ufficient to maintain public safety; the swing of the state’s hammer
must also be perceived as legitimate.264
Courts, too, have recognized that maintaining community per-
ceptions of fairness is an operational need. Within the criminal
system context, where a jurisdiction has implemented a race-based
remedy to achieve the community’s confidence, courts have rou-
tinely found the interest in doing so compelling.265 A number of
these remedies have been applied to law enforcement, as police are
so visible to the public.266 In Barhold v. Rodriguez, for example, the
260. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) (permitting an officer
to provide a justification for the stop after conducting the stop, regardless of the officer’s
subjective intent in effectuating the detention); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76
(1993) (permitting a script for law enforcement to use to justify otherwise unconstitutional
searches during a Terry stop).
261. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214,
214-15 (1983).
262. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial
Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882,
888 (2015) (stating “prosecutors are free to bring charges supported by probable cause for any
reason, except that they may not charge based on race, religion, or other unconstitutional
considerations” (citing Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962))).
263. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (stating the Court has “never
doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within
a statutory range”). But see Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-
makes-the-case-for-judgment/463380/ [https://perma.cc/44Y8-A8VT]. 
264. See ROBINSON & ROBINSON, supra note 257, at 13-14.
265. See, e.g., Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988); Talbert v. City of
Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1981); Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608
F.2d 671, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1979).
266. Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n, 608 F.2d at 695-96 (finding the jurisdiction’s assertions
for sufficient racial diversity on the police force particularly compelling because “the relation-
ship between government and citizens is seldom more visible, personal and important than
in police-citizen contact”). Police are considered to be the “gatekeepers of the criminal justice
system.” S. Rebecca Neusteter, Ram Subramanian, Jennifer Trone, Mawia Khogali & Cindy
Reed, Gatekeepers: The Role of Police in Ending Mass Incarceration, VERA INST. JUST., Aug.
2019, at 5, https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/gatekeepers-police-and-mass-incar
ceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG7Y-822F] (stating that rifts between the public and police
force “continue to raise questions of basic fairness, undermining the perceived legitimacy of
police by the public they serve and heightening the risk that communities may be unwilling
to rely on and cooperate with police in order to help prevent and solve crimes”); see U.S. DEP’T
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Second Circuit agreed it was a compelling interest for law enforce-
ment to appear unbiased in order to “carry out its mission effec-
tively.”267 In Talbert v. City of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit ac-
knowledged the connection between the community’s perception of
law enforcement and public safety:
[E]ffective crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the
public support and cooperation which result only from public
respect and confidence in the police. In short, the focus is not on
the superior performance of minority officers, but on the public’s
perception of law enforcement officials and institutions.268
All institutional actors—the police officer, prosecutor, judge,
and probation agent—are responsible for ensuring perceptions of
legitimacy. The Court has recognized that “[r]ace discrimination is
‘especially pernicious in the administration of justice’ ... [a]nd
public respect for our system of justice is undermined when the
system discriminates based on race.”269 Racially disparate pros-
ecution, sentencing, and probation practices “damage[ ] social net-
works, distort[ ] social norms, and destroy[ ] social citizenship” in
OF JUST., BUILDING TRUST BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE CITIZENS THEY SERVE 3, 33 (2009)
(“Building and maintaining community trust is the cornerstone of successful policing and law
enforcement.... The police department is often one of the most visible public representations
of a municipal government ... [and therefore] has a stake in building trust between the police
department and the public.”); CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43904, PUBLIC TRUST AND LAW EN-
FORCEMENT—A DISCUSSION FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 (2018).
267. 863 F.2d at 238 (finding the jurisdiction’s race-based remedy to racially diversify its
police force constitutional).
268. 648 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added) (quoting Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n, 608 F.2d at
695-96).
269. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005) (citation omitted) (quoting Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)). The Court also recognized that “[g]ranting the CDC an
exemption from the rule that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications would
undermine our ‘unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice
system.’” Id. at 512 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987)); accord CHARLES
W. OSTROM, BRIAN J. OSTROM & MATTHEW KLEIMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUDGES AND
DISCRIMINATION: ASSESSING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING 2 (2004)
(“The sentencing decision is the symbolic keystone of the criminal justice system: in it, the
conflicts between the goals of equal justice under the law and individualized justice with
punishment tailored to the offender are played out, and society’s moral principles and highest
values—life and liberty—are interpreted and applied.” (quoting NAT’L INST.JUST.,RESEARCH
ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (Alfred Blumstein ed., 1983))).
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communities of color.270 Prosecutorial offices are acutely aware of
the need to earn public confidence through the fair administration
of justice. The Department of Justice’s mission places equal
emphasis on its objective “to ensure public safety” and its obligation
to “ensure fair and impartial administration of justice.”271 The
California Attorney General similarly pledges to “[e]nforce and
apply all of our laws fairly and impartially”; “[e]nsure justice, safety
and liberty for everyone”; and “[e]ncourage economic prosperity,
equal opportunity and tolerance.”272 The perception of legitimacy,
the National Institute of Justice asserts, creates an environment of
trust and cooperation necessary to ensure public safety.273 Jurisdic-
tions are increasingly viewing racial equality as essential to earn
legitimacy from the communities served.274 The asymmetrical use
of force against communities of color has eroded criminal system
legitimacy.275 In 2003, the DOJ formally recognized the damage
done by racially disparate policing.276 Public confidence in law
enforcement is at an all-time low,277 especially in communities of
color.278 Racially disparate practices present “a ‘high risk’ of
contravening the core police objectives of controlling crime and
promoting public safety.”279
In the case study of Milwaukee, stakeholders have recognized
the urgency of addressing the erosion of trust within the county’s
270. See Roberts, supra note 136, at 1281.
271. About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/
S26C-UUHD].
272. About the Office of the Attorney General, CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/office
[https://perma.cc/2W3D-V7UC].
273. See NAT’L INST. JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION
OF THE POLICE 10 (2003).
274. See Race, Trust, and Police Legitimacy, NAT’LINST.JUST. (Jan. 9, 2013), https://nij.ojp.
gov/topics/articles/race-trust-and-police-legitimacy [https://perma.cc/FH6B-R5R7].
275. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
276. CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2003).
277. Aimee Ortiz, Confidence in Police Is at Record Low, Gallup Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-poll-police.html [https://
perma.cc/4YWK-LRB3] (“For the first time in its 27 years of measuring attitudes toward the
police, Gallup found that a majority of American adults do not trust law enforcement.”).
278. See id.
279. CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 63 (2015) (quoting JACK GLASER, SUSPECT RACE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCE OF
RACIAL PROFILING 96-126 (2015)).
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communities of color. Milwaukee leaders have convened a Race,
Equity and Procedural Justice Committee wholly focused on
achieving racial equity in its criminal justice system.280 The courts
have found that people of color in Milwaukee, for example, “feel
alienated from the police,” which damages “the trust between police
and the public central to achieving public safety.”281 District
Attorney Chisholm has publicly discussed how Milwaukee citizens’
“crisis of confidence” in the criminal system’s ability to operate in a
racially fair manner undermines public safety.282 The asymmetrical
use of force against communities of color has eroded criminal system
legitimacy.283
Milwaukee is not an outlier. Many jurisdictions are facing a crisis
in public confidence in communities of color where the criminal
system’s obligation to ensure public safety is frequently unfulfilled;
as such, “policing and the criminal justice system as a whole suffer
from low levels of perceived legitimacy.”284 In its 2017 task force
report, the American Bar Association was blunt:
There is much evidence to show that racial minorities believe
the criminal justice system does not treat them fairly. According
to a June 2016 Pew Research Poll, 84% of blacks reported their
belief that blacks are treated less fairly than whites in their
interactions with the police, and three-quarters say blacks are
treated less fairly in the courts. A January 2015 Reuters poll
reported that 69% of blacks and 54% of Latinos believe that the
police unfairly target minorities, compared to 29% of whites who
believe the same.285
Overwhelming evidence establishes that the criminal justice
system exerts a heavier toll on racial minorities.286 That burden is
280. See MILWAUKEE CMTY. JUST. COUNCIL, supra note 142.
281. See ACLU, supra note 148.
282. Reed & Chisholm, supra note 137, at 22.
283. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
284. ZOE MENTEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RACIAL RECONCILIATION, TRUTH-TELLING, AND
POLICE LEGITIMACY iv (2012).
285. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON BUILDING PUBLIC TRUST IN THE AMER-
ICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2017) (footnotes omitted), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/office_president/2_8_task_force_on_building_trust_in_american_j
ustice_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/77BU-GFQ8].
286. See, e.g., WILLIAM RHODES, RYAN KLING, JEREMY LUALLEN & CHRISTINA DYOUS,
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perhaps most notable in the context of policing, but it extends
throughout the criminal justice system, culminating in lengthy
terms of incarceration.287 For all these reasons, in order to remedy
these disparate conditions, “law-enforcement and correctional set-
tings” provide “the very clearest examples of cases in which depar-
tures from racial neutrality are permissible.”288
a. A Close Fit Between the Stated Interest and the
Institution’s Core Expertise and Mission
A court is more likely to defer to an institution’s assessment that
an interest is compelling if it relates to the institution’s mission. In
Bakke, the Court found it significant that the university was “seek-
ing to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the ful-
fillment of its mission.”289 In the criminal law context, courts
applying strict scrutiny will routinely defer to criminal system
claims that a need is mission critical; for example, that racial diver-
sity on the force is essential to security or public safety,290 or that
racial diversity of guards is essential to the success of a prison’s new
boot camp.291
Courts are more inclined to acknowledge an interest’s compelling
nature where the interest relates to an institution’s area of exper-
tise. In Grutter, the Court signaled its deference to the university’s
assessment that diversity in higher education is compelling by ex-
plaining, “[t]he Law School has determined, based on its experience
and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities
is necessary” to fulfilling its educational mission.292 Courts also will
strongly consider assessments of subject-matter experts who attest
to an interest’s compelling nature.293 Where institutional expertise
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FEDERAL SENTENCING DISPARITY: 2005-2012 67 (2015).
287. Id.
288. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996).
289. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
290. See Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988).
291. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920-21.
292. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). The Court was clear that the deference
given took place within the Court’s strict scrutiny review. Id. at 328 (“Our scrutiny of the
interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into account complex edu-
cational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.”).
293. Id. at 330 (“In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial,
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is weak, courts are less deferential to the assessment that an inter-
est is compelling, as in Croson294 and in Wygant.295
Courts recognize the value of hard-won, in-the-trenches experi-
ence that criminal law stakeholders bring to their judgment.296
Where a lower court sought to require a correctional institution to
produce empirical evidence in support of its challenged policy, the
appellate court reversed stating, “the district court’s analysis does
not reflect the requisite deference to the expertise and experience of
prison officials.”297 Relatedly, the judicial deference to the expertise
and discretion of criminal stakeholders only reinforces the judicial
crediting of a criminal system administrator’s representation that
a particular interest is tied to achieving public safety.298
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them
as professionals.’”) (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)); see also
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 280-82 (1998); Mitchell J. Chang,
The Positive Educational Effects of Racial Diversity on Campus, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED:
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 175, 181-83 (Gary Orfield & Michal
Kurlaender eds., 2001). See generally COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON
RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003).
294. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-502 (1989). In Croson, the
city had no institutional expertise in the largely privatized construction industry, but accord-
ing to the Court, engaged in “sheer speculation” regarding the reasons for racial disparities
in the construction industry. See id. at 499.
295. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). There, the school board
attempted to retain Black employees by laying off white employees first (irrespective of se-
niority). Id. at 270. The Board failed to connect its stated need for staff diversity to the
centrality of the institution’s mission or expertise, instead basing its proposal on an expressed
concern of “racial tension in the community that extended to its schools.” Id. at 270, 283.
296. Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995,
1999 (2017). For example, within the correctional environment, courts often defer to insti-
tutional expertise as to what conditions compromise inmate safety. James D. Nelson, Note,
Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REV. 2053, 2080-82 (2009); see
also Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2005) (accepting the judgment of
prison officials that individualized grooming accommodations would not protect the state’s
compelling interest); Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming a
district court judgment that relied on testimony from prison officials that a “hair-length policy
was necessary to prevent” contraband and escape attempts).
297. Hoevenaar, 422 F.3d at 371.
298. Commentators observe a tradition of judicial deference to criminal system actors
exercising discretion within the interpretation of constitutional issues. See, e.g., Carbado,
supra note 66, at 1520; Capers, supra note 66, at 64; Butler, supra note 2, at 865.
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b. Supplemental Constitutional Concerns Amplify the
 Compelling Nature of Institutional Needs
In Bakke, First Amendment free association interests fortified the
university’s assessment that racial diversity was critical to its edu-
cational mission.299 Companion constitutional concerns are present
at all criminal system intercept points, from arrest, to trial, to sen-
tencing, to incarceration. At the investigative stage, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits police from detaining civilians and suspects
on the basis of race, especially in geographic areas where a racial
group’s representation is significant.300 The Court in Terry v. Ohio
expressed concern over the inadequacy of the exclusionary rule to
protect civilians from state harassment and expressly encouraged
“the employment of other remedies” that might “curtail abuses.”301
During the prosecution stage, a defendant’s rights are protected by
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.302 In the correctional
space, Eighth Amendment requirements to provide for inmate safe-
ty and welfare inform institutional needs.303 The constellation of
constitutional rights that animate decision-making amplifies the
compelling nature of needs identified by criminal law stakeholders
to maintain system-wide perceptions of legitimacy and fairness.
299. See 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (finding persuasive the university’s argument that it
“must be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the
‘robust exchange of ideas,’” which is an assertion that is grounded in the First Amendment).
300. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (holding race alone
cannot furnish grounds for officer suspicion); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.,
22 F.3d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1994); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 569-70
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
301. 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
302. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (recognizing the right to material
and exculpatory information at trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (recog-
nizing the right against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 387 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(recognizing right to counsel in criminal cases where defendant is unable to afford an
attorney); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (clarifying the right to confront the
source of testimonial evidence offered against defendant); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
114 (1977) (holding that eyewitness examination procedures cannot be unnecessarily sugges-
tive); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (finding that a peremptory challenge may
not be used to exclude a juror based solely on race); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970)
(discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
303. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1976).
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c. The Existence of Current or Past Discrete Acts of Racial
 Discrimination Can Justify and Make More Urgent the
Institution’s Stated Interest
Where evidence of past racial discrimination is asserted, courts
are more open to race-based remediation when that racial harm is
specific to institutional practices that can be statistically ex-
pressed.304 A showing of “pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct” can create a “profound need and a firm
justification for ... race-conscious relief.”305 A court will expect
jurisdiction-specific showings of racial disparities—for most juris-
dictions, to look will be to find that “Black[ ] [persons] are more
likely than others to be arrested in almost every city for almost
every type of crime.”306 Milwaukee, for example, has been the site of
multiple studies revealing racially unequal treatment in surveil-
lance, arrest rates, charging decisions, pretrial detention, and
sentencing that are shocking in scope and significance.307 It is dif-
ficult to imagine a locality that has corrected the racist practices
within the criminal system. For example, if one drives an hour from
Milwaukee to Dane County, which includes the liberal enclave of
Madison, Wisconsin, one finds 47 percent of Black males between
the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine under the supervision of the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections.308 These conditions that un-
dermine public safety appear to be ever-present and everywhere.309
Racial harm at the site of criminal law is so pervasive that stud-
ies in social science observe, “the percentage of a neighborhood’s
304. See, e.g., Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 820, 822 (7th Cir. 2000).
305. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
306. Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Disparity’, USATODAY (Nov.
19, 2014, 2:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-
arrest-rates/19043207/ [https://perma.cc/C4WF-FH6X].
307. See supra Part I.B.
308. PAMELA E. OLIVER, DANE COUNTY RATES OF INCARCERATION AND COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION—2006 1 (2008), https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/
08/Dane-County-Rates-of-Incarceration-and-community-supervision.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5XRU-D55Z].
309. See Roberts, supra note 136, at 1281, 1297; Callie Harbin Burt, Ronald L. Simons &
Frederick X. Gibbons, Racial Discrimination, Ethnic-Racial Socialization, and Crime: A
Micro-sociological Model of Risk and Resilience, 77 AM. SOCIO. REV. 648, 650-51 (2012);
Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler & Bruce G. Link, Aggressive Policing and the
Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2323-24 (2014).
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black population ... is significantly associated with perceptions of the
severity of the neighborhood’s crime problem.”310 This toxic associa-
tion between race and criminality, itself, is an enduring feature of
crime control policy.311 Policing patterns reflect this prejudice, from
neighborhood to metropolis.312 These conditions are compounded by
prosecutorial practices, where declinations, diversion eligibility, and
the severity of charging decisions favor white defendants over Black
and Brown defendants.313 As to adjudication, pretrial detention and
sentencing patterns result in harsher outcomes for defendants of
color.314 These practices result in an alarming over-representation
of inmates of color—in recent years, more than 30 percent of the
prison population is Black, despite comprising only 12 percent of the
general population.315 These racially distorted conditions in the
criminal system serve to “entrench wider social patterns of racial
stratification.”316 Because of the pervasiveness of these racially dis-
parate practices, a jurisdiction’s record can be readily reinforced by
empirical and qualitative studies within scholarship, litigation, and
310. Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of Racial
Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOCIO. 717, 718 (2001) (em-
phasis added); accord Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q.
319, 322-24 (2004).
311. See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 1, 3-5 (2010).
312. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk
as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2409-13 (2017). In some commu-
nities of color, police intervention is fueled by cultivating informants, a destabilizing inter-
vention that creates a feedback loop forcing innocent and guilty alike to accuse others to avoid
or mitigate criminal sanctions. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and
Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 645-46, 648, 650 (2004). What the state
looks for, it will find or create, and if the state turns its gaze to Black neighborhoods, it will
find or assert unlawful conduct committed by Black persons (including charges for resisting
arrest). See Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 988-89 (2019); Ferguson,
supra note 43, at 1148-49.
313. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 27-30 (2013);
Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in the
Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 222, 237-38 (2004) (noting significant disparities in
pretrial treatment between white and Black or Hispanic defendants).
314. See Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minne-
sota’s Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 265 (2009); Yang, supra note 157,
at 1467 (finding judges “treat defendants of different races differently in setting bail”).
315. Gramlich, supra note 4.
316. Huq, supra note 1, at 1055.
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public policy assessments that continue to uncover ongoing, severe,
and systematic racial discrimination.317
Persons of color are afforded equal treatment under the Equal
Protection Clause,318 and throughout criminal investigation and ad-
judication are entitled to equal treatment under the Fourth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.319 Despite the promise of constitu-
tional protection, policing, prosecution, and sentencing practices
continue to reproduce racial harm and threaten system legit-
imacy.320 Seeking to meet their obligations of administering justice
in the absence of racial discrimination, and realizing that doing so
is critical to earning community-wide trust and legitimacy, juris-
dictions have considered race-informed remedies.321 This Section
assists jurisdictions in the articulation of the compelling interests
at play, and how these interests can be best articulated in the
attempt to satisfy strict scrutiny.
B. Narrowly Tailored
Any race-based remedy, under strict scrutiny review, must be
narrowly tailored.322 This Section takes up this issue. To do so, the
Article turns back to RAIs. As discussed, jurisdictions are finding
that racial disparities embedded in the system are undermining the
promise of RAIs to ensure the fair administration of justice.323
In determining whether a race-based remedy is narrowly drawn,
courts assess an institution’s prior efforts to achieve the compelling
interest through race-neutral means,324 whether the race-based
remedy responds to and is proportional to the particular need,325
whether the remedy is subject to periodic reevaluation,326 and the
degree of harm a race-based remedy visits on nonbeneficiaries.327
317. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
318. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
319. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Part II.A.1.c and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part I.B.
324. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).
325. See, e.g., id. at 2211.
326. See, e.g., id. at 2210.
327. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
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Using the RDC remedy proposed here, this Article provides a way
forward for jurisdictions to articulate how the implementation of a
race-based remedy in the criminal system potentially satisfies the
narrowly tailored requirement.
1. Prior Attempts to Use Race-Neutral Remedies
An institution has the “ultimate burden of demonstrating that
race-neutral alternatives that are both available and workable do
not suffice.”328 As to RAIs, the search for a race-neutral fix to racial
disparities has been exhaustive.329 Over the last decade, government
entities, private vendors, and public policy organizations have
sought to reduce racial harm reproduced by these tools.330 Two ap-
proaches ameliorate racial harms. The first is to remove data that
contributes to racial disparities, but does not appreciably contribute
to a tool’s predictive power.331 The second is to recalibrate how data
is reported in an effort to reduce racial distortion while still pre-
serving a tool’s predictive power.332
In Milwaukee, for example, the county first attempted to respond
to racial disparity in pretrial detention outcomes by implementing
an RAI—the MCPRAI.333 Racial disparities persisted, and in 2015
Milwaukee attempted an additional race-neutral fix, transitioning
328. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fisher I, 570
U.S. 297, 312 (2013)).
329. See supra Part I.C.
330. See MAUER & GHANDNOOSH, supra note 23, at 11-12.
331. Starr, supra note 29, at 851 (“[D]emographic and socioeconomic factors could be
excluded from risk prediction instruments without losing any significant predictive value.”).
For example, the Justice Department removed a person’s “age of first arrest [or] conviction”
from its tool, because the factor created more racial distortion than predictive power. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces Enhancements to the
Risk Assessment System and Updates on First Step Act Implementation (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-enhancements-risk-assessment-
system-and-updates-first-step-act [https://perma.cc/4PLK-TMDJ].
332. If, for example, algorithms used underlying crime rates instead of actual arrest rates
to assess an individual’s recidivism risk, it may help reduce some of the racial harm created
by police oversurveillance. See Mayson, supra note 7, at 2258-61. Despite this recalibration,
a host of racially discriminatory conditions persist: Black people are reported by white people
for perceived unlawful conduct; police departments have saturated neighborhoods of color
with confidential informants; and higher numbers of crimes occur in neighborhoods of color,
due to structurally racist conditions. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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to the Arnold Ventures’ PSA,334 which did not “consider factors that
could be discriminatory, such as race, sex, level of education, socio-
economic status, and neighborhood.”335 But the PSA, however
improved, relies on factors that are widely understood to be proxies
for race, including criminal history.336 Arnold Ventures itself con-
cedes that it has made efforts to “minimize” the tool’s “impact on
racial disparities.”337 Even as Milwaukee attempts to improve its
RAI, stakeholders recognize the limitation of these race-neutral
adjustments: police and prosecutors make racially disparate deci-
sions in Milwaukee that shape the RAI’s underlying data, and
judges exercise discretion during pretrial hearings that further
exacerbates the racial disparities.338 Milwaukee continues to make
further efforts; courts have agreed with residents of color that
policing in Milwaukee (which generates arrest and conviction rates)
causes dramatic racial inequities, but remedial efforts in this re-
spect have had little impact.339
The result? If the data informing the algorithm is flawed, the
algorithm’s results will reflect these flaws.340 When the racial harms
resulting from discriminatory practices are baked into the data,
race-neutral adjustments have limited effect.341 Thus, unless one
can extract the racial distortion that is otherwise embedded in a
data point, the only way to remove the distortion is to remove the
data point (such as, for example, “criminal history”). But doing this
can so blunt the tool’s predictive power as to obviate its utility. And
even if a jurisdiction sets in motion reforms to policing and adjudica-
tion practices intended to remove bias from new data (this has yet
to occur in any jurisdiction, despite concerted civil rights efforts),
the “criminal history” part of the data point remains historically
intact, as do illegitimate practices within the judiciary.342 Courts, in
334. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
335. Kremers, supra note 112.
336. See Public Safety Assessment: How it Works, supra note 33, at 1.
337. About the Public Safety Assessment: What Is the PSA?, supra note 121.
338. See supra Part I.B.
339. See supra Part I.B.
340. See Eaglin, supra note 17, at 72-73. Within the computer science disciplines, this is
referred to as the GIGO (“garbage in, garbage out”) principle. Mayson, supra note 7, at 2224
& n.23.
341. See Mayson, supra note 7, at 2294-95.
342. Brenner et al., supra note 48, at 276 (noting a study showing that a person reviewing
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any event, do not require jurisdictions to try every conceivable race-
neutral fix while racially unjust conditions persist.343 This is espe-
cially true if the underlying circumstances are compelling and
severe, as they are in the criminal system.344
Milwaukee is not alone. There has been a multi-jurisdictional
effort over a sustained period to achieve racial fairness through
race-neutral means.345 And yet, jurisdictions are still a long way
from achieving this goal.346 Race-neutral fixes have been exhaus-
tively attempted, and despite improvements to the tools, to policing,
and to prosecution practices, racial disparity in risk assessments
persists.
2. The Remedy Responds Directly to the Need
The Court requires a nexus between the remedy and achieving
the compelling interest.347 In Fisher II, the Court required the uni-
versity to show how its plan operated to “obtain[ ] ‘the educational
benefits that flow from student body diversity.’”348 There the Court
determined that the remedy—to provide a race-based adjustment to
applications for admission—responded directly to the need, which
was to achieve a holistic sense of diversity in the student body that
improved the educational experience for all students.349
similarly situated defendants with the same risk score will tend to conclude Black defendants
will act worse than predicted by the RAI, and white defendants will act better than predicted,
and highlighting another study that concluded judges “harbor the same kinds of implicit
biases as the general population”).
343. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).
344. For example, in Wittmer, Judge Posner upheld a decision to hire a “less qualified”
Black lieutenant over white candidates. 87 F.3d 916, 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1996). There, the
compelling need was the success of a new boot camp for which, given the authoritative and
strenuous environment and that Black inmates comprised 68 percent of participants, racial
diversity of personnel was essential to programmatic success, according to experts. Id. at 920.
Despite the general requirement that an institution attempt prior race-neutral remedies,
Judge Posner found no reason to require the attempt of race-neutral remedies (the institution
had not), or to assess the possibility of less invasive race-based remedies (such as a shift
rotation of existing personnel). Id. at 919-20.
345. See MAUER & GHANDNOOSH, supra note 23, at 2-3.
346. See id.
347. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211.
348. Id. at 2210 (quoting Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 297).
349. See id. at 2211, 2214.
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The RDC remedy is intended to restore public confidence in the
administration of criminal justice that is otherwise undermined by
the community perceptions of racially unequal treatment. Com-
munities subject to state coercion will not trust outcomes that
significantly differ along racial lines.350 Whether a portion of the
racial disparity is attributed to over-policing, to biased prosecution
and adjudication, or to systemic racism,351 from a community
perspective, the asymmetrical distribution of coercion along racial
lines is viewed as illegitimate.352 In this way, by implementing the
RDC remedy, which extracts the estimated portion of a person’s
score attributed to racial harm, a jurisdiction can demonstrate that
it is making a meaningful effort to administer criminal justice in a
racially fair manner, a condition essential to earning legitimacy
within the community.
3. The Remedy Is Proportional to the Harm
Being narrowly tailored “ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ [a]
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or
stereotype.”353 A light touch is favored, though a remedy with suffi-
cient justification may be invasive.354 An example of a remedy with
a light touch is described in Fisher II.355 There, the college’s assign-
ment of a “plus factor” to an applicant of color applied only to the
last 25 percent of class openings.356 Race was not heavily weighted,
but considered in addition to GPA, test scores, essays, extracurricu-
lars, work history, and letters of reference—“race [wa]s but a ‘factor
of a factor of a factor.’”357 As to the outcome—admission or rejection
from the university—the Court seemed placated by the remedy’s
marginal impact; the consideration of race was “meaningful” but
350. See Rappaport, supra note 1, at 714.
351. See id.
352. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 285, at 12.
353. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
354. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (upholding a “one-for-
one” hiring policy on the basis that it “was amply justified and narrowly tailored to serve ...
legitimate and laudable purposes”).
355. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206-07.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 2207 (quoting Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608).
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“still limited.”358 That the decision maker assessed race within con-
siderations unique to an individual applicant also appeased the
Court.359
Judicial concern is heightened where decision maker discretion
is limited because race overshadows other factors.360 A remedy that
obviates decision maker discretion is often portrayed as a quota: “a
program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportuni-
ties are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’”361 The
Court is apt to disqualify a set-aside regime, as in Bakke, where 16
of 100 slots were reserved for minority applicants to medical
school,362 and in Croson, where 30 percent of the subcontractors in
any municipal bid needed to be minority-owned businesses.363 The
“outcome-determinative” concern also led the Court in Gratz to re-
ject the university’s assignment of a twenty-point credit to racial
minority applicants.364 Though the remedy did not mandate a
certain number of slots for students of color, the size of the race-
based credit overwhelmed point allotments given to factors like
GPA.365 Importantly, it was the limitation of decision maker
discretion that was cause for concern, not that the remedy assigned
a fixed front-end value to race.366 For example, in Grutter and
358. See id. at 2212 (“The fact that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion
of admissions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of
unconstitutionality.”).
359. See id. at 2207.
360. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 279 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
361. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989) (plurality opinion)). The term “quota” is susceptible to
over-simplification and better relegated to the political arena. Still, the term finds doctrinal
traction. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (“A university cannot impose a fixed quota or
otherwise define diversity as ‘some specified percentage of a particular group merely because
of its race or ethnic origin.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Some scholars ask for
reconsideration. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 230, at 2294 (“With a focus on group access, one
goal could be that [university] application processes at least yield diversity and inclusion
numbers roughly consistent with demographic representation.”).
362. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978).
363. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
364. See 539 U.S. at 255 (finding a policy in which applicants were given an additional “20
points based upon his or her membership in an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority
group” unconstitutional); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (“[A]n amorphous claim that there
has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding
racial quota.”).
365. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
366. See id. at 273.
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Fisher II, the plus factors assigned to race were also “fixed”—yet,
the front-end adjustment was not so significant to be determinative
of one’s admission to or rejection from the university.367
Importantly, the Court also permits an invasive remedy where
the severity of racial harm calls for it.368 Otherwise, a jurisdiction
that visited severe harms on a racial group would be insulated from
consequence. A court looks for a showing of proportionality between
the invasive nature of the remedy and the severity of conditions in
need of correction.369 In United States v. Paradise, the Court cer-
tified a remedy that obviated decision maker discretion; there, the
Alabama Department of Safety had to hire a Black officer for every
new hire of a white officer.370 The Court concluded the “one-for-one”
remedy was narrowly tailored,371 given that the Department had
engaged in “long term, open, and pervasive” discrimination,372 the
Department had resisted less invasive remedies,373 and the remedy
was “flexible in application at all ranks” and “[could] be waived if no
qualified black candidates [were] available.”374 The takeaway? There
is a direct relationship at play: the more urgent and severe the con-
ditions, the more invasive the remedy can be and still be narrowly
tailored. As the Court in Grutter observed, narrowly tailored does
not mean the remedy treads lightly; rather, the remedy must be
“specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish [its] purpose.”375
How does the RDC fare? The RDC is particularly responsive to
proportionality concerns, as it is designed to measure the particular
367. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-36 (2003); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206-07.
368. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
369. See, e.g., id.
370. See id. at 177, 185.
371. Id. at 171.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 155 n.2.
374. Id. at 177.
375. See 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)). There
is yet another proportionality concern; one expects heightened judicial skepticism of “one-size-
fits-all” remedies that consolidate discretion in officials who are not responsive to the targeted
forum. The more local the remedy’s reach (an institutional, municipal, or county approach),
the more confidence there can be in the remedy’s responsiveness to individuals affected. See
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542 (2013) (“[A] statute’s disparate geographic
coverage [must be] sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” (quoting Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009))).
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racial disparities reproduced by a particular jurisdiction’s tool.376
The more severe the racial disparity in a jurisdiction, the more sig-
nificant the RDC adjustment.377 The RDC’s disparity differential
will be different in every jurisdiction on account of local practices,378
the tool adopted,379 and risk levels set by the jurisdiction.380
Unlike in Fisher II or Grutter, where the “plus factor” assigned to
race was a rough approximation of racial harms,381 the RDC’s plus
factor is a measure of the particular racial harm present, at that
time, in that jurisdiction.382 Under the RDC, a certain value will
likely be subtracted from a person of color’s raw score.383 This ad-
justment is likely to be a “factor of a factor of a factor.”384 The RDC
adjustment may not, in application, alter the tool’s final assessment;
a person may be designated “high-risk,” even with the adjustment.
And if the RDC adjustment does change the RAI’s result (say
from “medium-risk” to “low-risk”)? In jurisdictions, the RAI result
tends to be one of many factors a judge considers before making a
decision (say as to pretrial detention, probation conditions, or length
of sentence); the final outcome remains in the court’s discretion, in
turn influenced by statutory considerations, arguments of counsel,
information from witnesses, pretrial reports, and victim
statements.385 Where the judge is expected to adhere to and deviate
from the RAI’s result according to some formula (for example,
376. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
377. See, e.g., supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
378. Some observe criminal jurisdictions as “a loose affiliation among independent law
enforcement agencies, individual counties, local jails, and state prisons.” See Klingele, supra
note 49, at 558. Practices can vary dramatically. In Milwaukee County, Black residents are
3.2 times more likely than white residents to be arrested for marijuana possession, while
immediately north in Ozaukee County, the ratio is 34:1. Hess, supra note 179.
379. See Eaglin, supra note 17, at 69-72 (providing illustrative list of tools available to
jurisdictions).
380. See id. at 86-87 (explaining that low, medium, or high risk designations will vary by
tool or by jurisdiction).
381. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003).
382. See supra Part I.D.
383. See supra Part I.D.
384. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207 (quoting Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608).
385. See Jennifer Skeem, Nicholas Scurich & John Monahan, Impact of Risk Assessment
on Judges’ Fairness in Sentencing Relatively Poor Defendants, 44 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 51, 58
(2020); Starr, supra note 29, at 865 (observing that it is possible (if not likely) that “judges’
current clinical assessments could overweight some of those variables relative to the weights
assigned by the actuarial instruments”).
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eighty-twenty), the final decision is still the court’s.386 In sum,
“[u]ltimately, judges make decisions—not risk assessments.”387
In Milwaukee, for example, the PSA’s method to calculate wheth-
er a person falls within a low, medium, or high-risk category occurs
in three stages: the raw score calculation, the scaled score cal-
culation, and the matrix calculation.388 As to a defendant’s raw
score, the PSA employs a binary approach: a “yes” to a question is
scored (1), a “no” is scored (0).389 A raw score is generated for each
category: the risk of defendant’s failure to appear (FTA), new
criminal arrest (NCA), and new violent criminal arrest (NVCA).390
Raw scores for each category are then scaled.391 This means two
defendants may have different raw scores as to the risk of FTA, but
because the two scores fall within a certain range, they are scored
exactly the same.392 Next, these scaled scores are placed within a
matrix.393 Each jurisdiction constructs its own matrix.394 The matrix
is designed to assess whether a defendant, if released, should be
386. See Skeem et al., supra note 385, at 51.
387. Id.
388. See Public Safety Assessment: How It Works, supra note 33, at 1-4; Guide to the Release
Conditions Matrix, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH. 2 (June 2020), https://
advancingpretrial.org/guide/guide-to-the-release-condition-matrix/ [https://perma.cc/VY66-
ZSN6].
389. Public Safety Assessment: How It Works, supra note 33, at 2.
390. Id. at 1. The PSA considers different factors when generating raw scores for each
category. For FTA, factors include: “[p]ending charge at the time of the arrest,” “[p]rior con-
viction (misdemeanor or felony),” “[p]rior failure to appear in the past 2 years,” and “[p]rior
failure to appear older than 2 years.” Id. at 2. For NCA, factors include: “[a]ge at current
arrest,” “[p]ending charge at the time of the arrest,” “[p]rior misdemeanor conviction,” “[p]rior
felony conviction,” “[p]rior violent conviction,” “[p]rior failure to appear in the past 2 years,”
and “[p]rior sentence to incarceration.” Id. at 3. For NVCA, factors include: “[c]urrent violent
offense,” “[c]urrent violent offense and 20 years old or younger,” “[p]ending charge at the time
of the arrest,” “[p]rior conviction (misdemeanor or felony),” and “[p]rior violent conviction.” Id.
at 4.
391. See id. at 4.
392. An FTA raw score can range 0-7; the scaled score 0-6 (for example, a raw score of 3 or
4 will both be scaled at 4). An NCA raw score can range 0-13; the scaled score 0-6 (for ex-
ample, a raw score of 9-13 will all be scaled at 6). For NVCA, a raw score can range 0-7; the
scaled score 1-6 (a score of 1-3 receives a “no” violence flag, while 4-6 receives a “yes” violence
flag). See id. at 2-4.
393. See Guide to the Release Conditions Matrix, supra note 388, at 2.
394. Id. at 1.
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subject to no conditions or severe conditions.395 The matrix is
designed to aid judicial officers in decision-making.396 The matrix in
Milwaukee looks like this:
Risk Information & Recommendation—Risk Indicator Scores:
FTA = 4 NCA = 3 NVCA = No
Pursuant to the matrix, defendants with different scaled scores
can find themselves in the same risk category. Because the matrix
does not include NVCA, the severity of the crime charged is wholly
subject to judicial discretion.397 A defendant charged with a first-
degree violent offense who has no criminal history, for example, will
score low on the PSA.398 But any final determinations of conditions
or confinement are left to the judge.399 Within Milwaukee, courts not
only view the PSA assessment as advisory, but consider other
factors.400 In Milwaukee, application of the RDC would likely be
considered a “light touch,” even if the disparity differentials were
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 10.
398. Id.
399. See id. at 4.
400. See supra notes 112, 118-19 and accompanying text.
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large, because the race-informed adjustment is part of a holistic,
discretionary review.
4. A Remedy That Does Not Unduly Burden Members of a
Racial Group
Courts are more resistant to and require a higher level of justifi-
cation for any race-based remedy that “unduly harm[s] members of
any racial group.”401 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, for
example, the Court observed that the remedy, which contemplated
firing white employees first during layoffs, was much more burden-
some than an alternative (not considered by the institution) that
would make adjustments to retain diversity at the hiring stage,
where burdens distributed to white applicants would be more dif-
fuse.402 In contrast, in Fisher II, the Court found the burden on
white applicants acceptable under the circumstances.403 There, the
Court noted the race-based remedy only applied after 75 percent of
the student body had already been selected through a state-man-
dated, race-neutral process.404 As to filling the remaining quarter of
the class, admissions relied on a whole host of factors, of which the
applicant’s race might be a “subfactor.”405 The Court pointed out, as
to the plaintiff, a white applicant, “the largest impact” on her chance
of admission was not the race-based remedy but her ineligibility to
qualify for consideration under the race-neutral process that ac-
counted for 75 percent of the student body.406
Unlike the complainants in Wygant and Fisher II, a white defen-
dant challenging the RDC would be unable to argue that his status
was affected at all by the RDC remedy. A white defendant’s risk as-
sessment would remain the same in the absence or presence of the
RDC remedy.407 Given the Court’s acceptance of remedies that
significantly burden nonbeneficiaries, the remedy proposed here,
401. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
402. See 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1986).
403. See 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
404. Id. at 2206.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 2208-09.
407. See supra Part I.D.
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which does not negatively affect a white defendant, is compliant
with constitutional demands.408
5. The Remedy Is Subject to Periodic Reevaluation
The Court requires a “continuing obligation to satisfy the burden
of strict scrutiny in light of changing circumstances.”409 The Court
in Fisher II instructed the university to engage in a “periodic re-
assessment of the constitutionality, and efficacy, of its” race-based
approach.410 The “assessment must be undertaken in light of the
experience the school has accumulated and the data it has gathered
since the adoption” of the race-based remedy.411 This judicial con-
cern seems prospective—a warning—versus a test of whether the
remedy is narrowly tailored right now. And yet, Justice Alito in his
Fisher II dissent asserted that the university’s goal of achieving a
“critical mass” of racial diversity was not an adequately defined
goal.412 According to Justice Alito, it is not only impossible to know
whether a remedy addresses a need that is undefined, but it is also
impossible to know when the remedy is no longer needed.413
The RDC remedy is responsive to Justice Alito’s concerns. The
RDC is “ephemeral,” as it “is contingent upon the [jurisdiction’s]
own conduct.”414 The goal—the lack of racial disparity in a jurisdic-
tion’s assignment of risk scores—is measurable.415 And because the
goal is measurable, the RDC remedy has a conditional shelf-life, an
articulable end-point: it becomes unnecessary as a jurisdiction at-
tains racial parity across risk scores. The majority in Fisher II did
408. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 182 (1987) (“The one-for-one requirement
does not require the layoff and discharge of white employees and therefore does not impose
burdens of the sort that concerned the plurality in Wygant.” (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986))).
409. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
410. Id. at 2210.
411. Id. The Court in Shelby County v. Holder underscored this obligation, asserting that
Congress had failed to recognize the circumstances no longer justified the original remedy—
federal supervision under the authority of the Voting Rights Act. See 570 U.S. 529, 535-36
(2013) (“[C]urrent burdens ... must be justified by current needs.” (quoting Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009))).
412. See 136 S. Ct. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting).
413. See id.
414. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178 (1987).
415. See supra Part I.D.
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not find Justice Alito’s concerns compelling—but that lack of con-
cern could have been a function of the remedy’s light touch in that
case.416 Still, it is notable that as to the implementation of the RDC,
the goal line is visible, and the concerns raised by Justice Alito in
Fisher II are not present here. The need for the RDC can be re-
evaluated periodically, and can be done with exacting clarity. Each
time the disparity differential is re-evaluated, the disparity dif-
ferentials will be adjusted or eliminated. The RDC’s endpoint is
determined by advances within the criminal system to put an end
to reproducing the racial harm that distorts the accuracy of the risk
tool; if a jurisdiction so succeeds (namely, if the racial disparities are
within a tolerable level accepted by the jurisdiction), the RDC
remedy would be discontinued.417
In sum, the criminal system’s obligation to ensure public safety
presents favorable conditions for the articulation of a compelling in-
terest, especially when coupled with constitutional protections that
require fair treatment. Whether a jurisdiction’s race-based approach
to the mitigation of racial harms is narrowly tailored will be subject
to a case-by-case assessment.418 The examination here of the RDC
suggests that making this showing is possible, especially where
jurisdictions have a track record of attempting to address racial
disparities through race-neutral remedies. In particular, the RDC
remedy provides an example of an ephemeral remedy that responds
to and is proportional to racial harms present in a jurisdiction, with-
out visiting harms on nonbeneficiaries.419
CONCLUSION
The call for affirmative, race-based remedies that Professor
Butler made over twenty years ago, and the remedies he proposed,
416. Within the criminal justice context, an undefined goal line has not provided an
obstacle. In Wittmer v. Peters, Judge Posner accepted the remedy of hiring a “black lieutenant
[who was] needed because the black inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional
game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority
in the camp.” 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). When would such remedies not be justified?
It was unclear. See id. at 920-21. The warden stated the remedy was necessary for the success
of the program—a totally undefined marker. See id. at 917, 920.
417. See supra Part I.D.
418. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
419. See supra Part I.D.
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deserve reconsideration.420 Since Butler wrote his article, the Su-
preme Court has provided more guidance as to charting a path that
complies with strict scrutiny analysis.421 The particular circum-
stances surrounding the criminal law context, the stakes at issue,
and the judicial deference that is afforded to the expertise of
criminal stakeholders present an opportunity for jurisdictions to
address racial harms. Race-informed approaches to mitigate racial
disparities in arrests, declination reviews, charging decisions, sen-
tencing, and incarceration rates provide opportunities to account for
a violent and racist system. No doubt, there will be resistance.
Equally, jurisdictions seeking to mitigate racist harm will have
much to bring to the battle.
Jurisdictions that consider race-informed approaches to address-
ing racial disparities in criminal law will need to articulate and pro-
vide the basis for any stated compelling interest and will need to
craft a remedy that is narrowly tailored in the circumstances pre-
sented. The compelling interest proposed here—that the people
must have confidence that the criminal system is operating fairly to
achieve its core mission of ensuring public safety—has a strong an-
chor in the mission statements of criminal system stakeholders. The
expertise that criminal system actors bring to the discussion over
jurisdictional objectives, including input from police, prosecutors,
judges, and correctional personnel, is a critical component to
surviving strict scrutiny review.
As to anticipated equal protection challenges, this Article pro-
vides a template for jurisdictions to follow. Most scholarship
addresses race-based policies in education and government contract-
ing.422 Flying under the radar are efforts, many successful, of crim-
inal system stakeholders to institute race-informed remedies to
achieve public safety objectives.423 Though strict scrutiny applies,
courts seem more deferential in the criminal law context.424 This
judicial deference, however uncharacteristic within strict scrutiny
review, is a central feature of criminal law scholarship, in which
420. See generally Butler, supra note 2.
421. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2198.
422. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
423. See, e.g., supra note 280 and accompanying text.
424. See Spiegel, supra note 16, at 2290-91.
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commentators observe a tradition of judicial deference to criminal
system actors exercising discretion.425 Given their uniquely favored
position, criminal system actors can and should consider race-
informed remedies to address race-based concerns.
425. See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 66, at 1520.
